“Osanna, sanctus Deus sabaòth,
superillustrans claritate tua
felices ignes horum malacòth!”
Così, volgendosi a la nota sua,
fu viso a me cantare essa sustanza,
sopra la qual doppio lume s'addua;
ed essa e l'altre mossero a sua danza,
e quasi velocissime faville
mi si velar di sùbita distanza.
Io dubitava e dicea “Dille, dille!”
fra me, “dille” dicea, “a la mia donna
che mi diseta con le dolci stille.”
Ma quella reverenza che s'indonna
di tutto me, pur per Be e per ice,
mi richinava come l'uom ch'assonna.
Poco sofferse me cotal Beatrice
e cominciò, raggiandomi d'un riso
tal, che nel foco faria l'uom felice:
“Secondo mio infallibile avviso,
come giusta vendetta giustamente
punita fosse, t'ha in pensier miso;
ma io ti solverò tosto la mente;
e tu ascolta, ché le mie parole
di gran sentenza ti faran presente.
Per non soffrire a la virtù che vole
freno a suo prode, quell' uom che non nacque,
dannando sé, dannò tutta sua prole;
onde l'umana specie inferma giacque
giù per secoli molti in grande errore,
fin ch'al Verbo di Dio discender piacque
u' la natura, che dal suo fattore
s'era allungata, unì a sé in persona
con l'atto sol del suo etterno amore.
Or drizza il viso a quel ch'or si ragiona:
questa natura al suo fattore unita,
qual fu creata, fu sincera e buona;
ma per sé stessa pur fu ella sbandita
di paradiso, però che si torse
da via di verità e da sua vita.
La pena dunque che la croce porse
s'a la natura assunta si misura,
nulla già mai sì giustamente morse;
e così nulla fu di tanta ingiura,
guardando a la persona che sofferse,
in che era contratta tal natura.
Però d'un atto uscir cose diverse:
ch'a Dio e a' Giudei piacque una morte;
per lei tremò la terra e 'l ciel s'aperse.
Non ti dee oramai parer più forte,
quando si dice che giusta vendetta
poscia vengiata fu da giusta corte.
Ma io veggi' or la tua mente ristretta
di pensiero in pensier dentro ad un nodo,
del qual con gran disio solver s'aspetta.
Tu dici: 'Ben discerno ciò ch'i' odo;
ma perché Dio volesse, m'è occulto,
a nostra redenzion pur questo modo.'
Questo decreto, frate, sta sepulto
a li occhi di ciascuno il cui ingegno
ne la fiamma d'amor non è adulto.
Veramente, però ch'a questo segno
molto si mira e poco si discerne,
dirò perché tal modo fu più degno.
La divina bontà, che da sé sperne
ogne livore, ardendo in sé, sfavilla
sì che dispiega le bellezze etterne.
Ciò che da lei sanza mezzo distilla
non ha poi fine, perché non si move
la sua imprenta quand' ella sigilla.
Ciò che da essa sanza mezzo piove
libero è tutto, perché non soggiace
a la virtute de le cose nove.
Più l'è conforme, e però più le piace;
ché l'ardor santo ch'ogne cosa raggia,
ne la più somigliante è più vivace.
Di tutte queste dote s'avvantaggia
l'umana creatura, e s'una manca,
di sua nobilità convien che caggia.
Solo il peccato è quel che la disfranca
e falla dissimìle al sommo bene,
per che del lume suo poco s'imbianca;
e in sua dignità mai non rivene,
se non rïempie, dove colpa vòta,
contra mal dilettar con giuste pene.
Vostra natura, quando peccò tota
nel seme suo, da queste dignitadi,
come di paradiso, fu remota;
né ricovrar potiensi, se tu badi
ben sottilmente, per alcuna via,
sanza passar per un di questi guadi:
o che Dio solo per sua cortesia
dimesso avesse, o che l'uom per sé isso
avesse sodisfatto a sua follia.
Ficca mo l'occhio per entro l'abisso
de l'etterno consiglio, quanto puoi
al mio parlar distrettamente fisso.
Non potea l'uomo ne' termini suoi
mai sodisfar, per non potere ir giuso
con umiltate obedïendo poi,
quanto disobediendo intese ir suso;
e questa è la cagion per che l'uom fue
da poter sodisfar per sé dischiuso.
Dunque a Dio convenia con le vie sue
riparar l'omo a sua intera vita,
dico con l'una, o ver con amendue.
Ma perché l'ovra tanto è più gradita
da l'operante, quanto più appresenta
de la bontà del core ond' ell' è uscita
la divina bontà che 'l mondo imprenta,
di proceder per tutte le sue vie,
a rilevarvi suso, fu contenta.
Né tra l'ultima notte e 'l primo die
sì alto o sì magnifico processo,
o per l'una o per l'altra, fu o fie:
ché più largo fu Dio a dar sé stesso
per far l'uom sufficiente a rilevarsi,
che s'elli avesse sol da sé dimesso;
e tutti li altri modi erano scarsi
a la giustizia, se 'l Figliuol di Dio
non fosse umilïato ad incarnarsi.
Or per empierti bene ogne disio,
ritorno a dichiararti in alcun loco,
perché tu veggi lì così com' io.
Tu dici: 'Io veggio l'acqua, io veggio il foco,
l'aere e la terra e tutte lor misture
venire a corruzione, e durar poco;
e queste cose pur furon creature;
per che, se ciò ch'è detto è stato vero,
esser dovrien da corruzion sicure.'
Li angeli, frate, e 'l paese sincero
nel qual tu se', dir si posson creati,
sì come sono, in loro essere intero;
ma li alimenti che tu hai nomati
e quelle cose che di lor si fanno
da creata virtù sono informati.
Creata fu la materia ch'elli hanno;
creata fu la virtù informante
in queste stelle che 'ntorno a lor vanno.
L'anima d'ogne bruto e de le piante
di complession potenzïata tira
lo raggio e 'l moto de le luci sante;
ma vostra vita sanza mezzo spira
la somma beninanza, e la innamora
di sé sì che poi sempre la disira.
E quinci puoi argomentare ancora
vostra resurrezion, se tu ripensi
come l'umana carne fessi allora
che li primi parenti intrambo fensi.”
"Osanna sanctus Deus Sabaoth,
Superillustrans claritate tua
Felices ignes horum malahoth!"
In this wise, to his melody returning,
This substance, upon which a double light
Doubles itself, was seen by me to sing,
And to their dance this and the others moved,
And in the manner of swift-hurrying sparks
Veiled themselves from me with a sudden distance.
Doubting was I, and saying, "Tell her, tell her,"
Within me, "tell her," saying, "tell my Lady,"
Who slakes my thirst with her sweet effluences;
And yet that reverence which doth lord it over
The whole of me only by B and ICE,
Bowed me again like unto one who drowses.
Short while did Beatrice endure me thus;
And she began, lighting me with a smile
Such as would make one happy in the fire:
"According to infallible advisement,
After what manner a just vengeance justly
Could be avenged has put thee upon thinking,
But I will speedily thy mind unloose;
And do thou listen, for these words of mine
Of a great doctrine will a present make thee.
By not enduring on the power that wills
Curb for his good, that man who ne'er was born,
Damning himself damned all his progeny;
Whereby the human species down below
Lay sick for many centuries in great error,
Till to descend it pleased the Word of God
To where the nature, which from its own Maker
Estranged itself, he joined to him in person
By the sole act of his eternal love.
Now unto what is said direct thy sight;
This nature when united to its Maker,
Such as created, was sincere and good;
But by itself alone was banished forth
From Paradise, because it turned aside
Out of the way of truth and of its life.
Therefore the penalty the cross held out,
If measured by the nature thus assumed,
None ever yet with so great justice stung,
And none was ever of so great injustice,
Considering who the Person was that suffered,
Within whom such a nature was contracted.
From one act therefore issued things diverse;
To God and to the Jews one death was pleasing;
Earth trembled at it and the Heaven was opened.
It should no longer now seem difficult
To thee, when it is said that a just vengeance
By a just court was afterward avenged.
But now do I behold thy mind entangled
From thought to thought within a knot, from which
With great desire it waits to free itself.
Thou sayest, 'Well discern I what I hear;
But it is hidden from me why God willed
For our redemption only this one mode.'
Buried remaineth, brother, this decree
Unto the eyes of every one whose nature
Is in the flame of love not yet adult.
Verily, inasmuch as at this mark
One gazes long and little is discerned,
Wherefore this mode was worthiest will I say.
Goodness Divine, which from itself doth spurn
All envy, burning in itself so sparkles
That the eternal beauties it unfolds.
Whate'er from this immediately distils
Has afterwards no end, for ne'er removed
Is its impression when it sets its seal.
Whate'er from this immediately rains down
Is wholly free, because it is not subject
Unto the influences of novel things.
The more conformed thereto, the more it pleases;
For the blest ardour that irradiates all things
In that most like itself is most vivacious.
With all of these things has advantaged been
The human creature; and if one be wanting,
From his nobility he needs must fall.
'Tis sin alone which doth disfranchise him,
And render him unlike the Good Supreme,
So that he little with its light is blanched,
And to his dignity no more returns,
Unless he fill up where transgression empties
With righteous pains for criminal delights.
Your nature when it sinned so utterly
In its own seed, out of these dignities
Even as out of Paradise was driven,
Nor could itself recover, if thou notest
With nicest subtilty, by any way,
Except by passing one of these two fords:
Either that God through clemency alone
Had pardon granted, or that man himself
Had satisfaction for his folly made.
Fix now thine eye deep into the abyss
Of the eternal counsel, to my speech
As far as may be fastened steadfastly!
Man in his limitations had not power
To satisfy, not having power to sink
In his humility obeying then,
Far as he disobeying thought to rise;
And for this reason man has been from power
Of satisfying by himself excluded.
Therefore it God behoved in his own ways
Man to restore unto his perfect life,
I say in one, or else in both of them.
But since the action of the doer is
So much more grateful, as it more presents
The goodness of the heart from which it issues,
Goodness Divine, that doth imprint the world,
Has been contented to proceed by each
And all its ways to lift you up again;
Nor 'twixt the first day and the final night
Such high and such magnificent proceeding
By one or by the other was or shall be;
For God more bounteous was himself to give
To make man able to uplift himself,
Than if he only of himself had pardoned;
And all the other modes were insufficient
For justice, were it not the Son of God
Himself had humbled to become incarnate.
Now, to fill fully each desire of thine,
Return I to elucidate one place,
In order that thou there mayst see as I do.
Thou sayst: 'I see the air, I see the fire,
The water, and the earth, and all their mixtures
Come to corruption, and short while endure;
And these things notwithstanding were created;'
Therefore if that which I have said were true,
They should have been secure against corruption.
The Angels, brother, and the land sincere
In which thou art, created may be called
Just as they are in their entire existence;
But all the elements which thou hast named,
And all those things which out of them are made,
By a created virtue are informed.
Created was the matter which they have;
Created was the informing influence
Within these stars that round about them go.
The soul of every brute and of the plants
By its potential temperament attracts
The ray and motion of the holy lights;
But your own life immediately inspires
Supreme Beneficence, and enamours it
So with herself, it evermore desires her.
And thou from this mayst argue furthermore
Your resurrection, if thou think again
How human flesh was fashioned at that time
When the first parents both of them were made."
If one were to select a single passage from the entire Commedia that seems most self-consciously wrought and thoroughly marked by poetic exuberance, it might be difficult to find one more fitting that description than this, with its opening mixture of Hebrew and Latin, the mysterious “double light” glowing upon Justinian, the sudden departure of that soul and his dancing fellows, the protagonist's wild excitement in his bafflement over a theological question, and, finally, the linguistic playfulness of the poet's reference to Beatrice's name. It is as though Dante were apologizing in advance for the lack of poetic energy that typifies the rest of the canto, turned over to the theological needs of its protagonist as ministered to by his guide.
Canto VII almost seems to be offered as reassurance to readers with a religious and/or theological bent that we've closed the books on Roman history and Italian politics and now will stick to our good Christian knitting - for a while, at least. However, for the imperial resonances in the opening three terzine, see Giovanni Fallani (“Il Canto VII” in “Paradiso”: Letture degli anni 1979-81, ed. S. Zennaro [Rome: Bonacci, 1989], pp. 224-27).
See Tozer's translation and note (comm. to vv. 1-3): “'Hosanna, holy God of hosts, who by Thy brightness dost illuminate from above the happy fires of these realms.' These verses appear to have been Dante's own, not a hymn of the Church; but they are in Latin, to correspond to other mediaeval hymns. malacoth: as Dante required a rhyme for Sabaoth – no easy thing to find – he availed himself of the word malachoth, which he met with in St. Jerome's Preface to the Vulgate, where it is translated by regnorum (realms). The proper form of this, which is read in modern editions of the Vulgate, is mamlachot, but in Dante's time malachoth was the accepted reading.”
For glossolalia (“speaking in tongues”) as a concern to Dante, see Hollander (Dante and Paul's “five words with understanding,” Occasional Papers, No. 1, Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Texts and Studies [Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1992)]. And see Giuseppe Di Scipio (The Presence of Pauline Thought in the Works of Dante [Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995], p. 281) for another assertion that Inferno VII.1 is a parodic version of glossolalia. Sarolli, who almost gets credit for being the first writer to connect, in an oppositional relation, the first lines of this canto with those of the seventh canto of Inferno, “Pape Satàn, pape Satàn, aleppe!” (Prolegomena alla “Divina Commedia” [Florence: Olschki, 1971], pp. 289-90), also unaccountably urges a reader to understand that the macaronic passage includes, not only Hebrew and Latin, but Greek. (Tommaseo, in passing, does mention Inf. VII.1 in conjunction with the opening of Par. VII, thus depriving Sarolli of an honor he merits, since Tommaseo makes no effort to deal with the significance of the phenomenon he has observed.)
See the note to.Paradiso V.1. This is the third consecutive canto that begins with a speaker's voice (rather than narration) and the second consecutive canto to begin with the same speaker's voice, both of these phenomena unique occurrences.
Justinian's first word of his last speech, Osanna, has a history in the poem: see Purgatorio XI.11 and XXIX.51. After this appearance, it also appears in Paradiso VIII.29; XXVIII.118; XXXII.135. Its six appearances make it the most present “foreign” word in the poem. The Ottimo hears its resonance from the shouts for the entry of Jesus into Jerusalem (e.g., John. 12:13); Benvenuto, discussing (comm. to Par. VIII.22-30) the word's appearance in Paradiso VIII.29 has this to say: “Ista vox hebraica significat immensam affectionem mentis quae non potest bene exprimi graece vel latine” (This Hebrew word signifies immense mental affection which cannot be properly expressed either in Greek or in Latin). The second Hebrew word in this line, sabaòth, is genitive plural “of the armies” (or “hosts,” as Tozer translates, an English version of Latin hostis [enemy], but without its sense of opposition).
For the program of song in the last cantica, see the note to Paradiso XXI.58-60.
God is depicted as shining down from above and illumining these saved souls who, along with Justinian, have appeared to Dante in Mercury in the moments before they withdraw from Dante's presence.
Justinian is now presented as a “substance,” an irreducible human soul, singing this holy song. We perhaps now understand why Dante has gone to such lengths to associate the emperor, inspired keeper of the Roman laws, and himself, inspired poet of empire, in the preceding canto (see Par. VI.11; VI.23; VI.88); their tasks are not dissimilar.
The neologism s'addua is problematic. Readers are divided as to what exactly the double light represents, and there are widely various opinions. Mazzoni (“Il canto VI del Paradiso,” Letture classensi 9-10 [1982]: 142), suggests that these lights are, the one, earthly, the other, heavenly, that is, the emperor's past and present identities. Bosco/Reggio (comm. to this verse) are of the opinion that the lights are of the warrior and of the legislator. However, as we have seen in the preceding canto, Justinian seems most eager to put the military life behind him (Par. VI.25-27); thus it would be strange for Dante to treat him in such wise. And see Rachel Jacoff (“Sacrifice and Empire: Thematic Analogies in San Vitale and the Paradiso,” in Renaissance Studies in Honor of Craig Hugh Smyth, ed. Andrew Morrogh et al. [Florence: Giunti Barbèra, 1985], pp. 323-24), arguing for Virgil's phrase “geminas... flammas,” the description of Augustus at the helm during the battle of Actium, his brows casting a double flame, as he is portrayed on the shield of Aeneas (Aen. VIII.680, part of the same passage visited in the last canto: see the note to Par. VI.79-81). That seems a promising lead to follow. However, it would probably be strange for Dante to have “borrowed” Augustus's identity for Justinian. There is also a possibility that Dante is thinking of the passage in Acts 2:3-4 in which the apostles are given the gift of glossolalia. There appeared to them cloven tongues of fire; these settled on each of them; they were then filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak such languages as the Spirit gave them to utter. That is possibly reflected in what has been occurring in the opening lines of Canto VII; however, there may be a problem with the “dispertitae linguae tanquam ignis,” which may not be all that well described by the phrase “doppio lume.”
Bosco/Reggio point out that “s'addua” (inflected form of the verb coined by Dante, adduarsi) will soon be joined by such other numerical coinages as incinquarsi (Par. IX.40) and intrearsi (Par. XIII.57).
Whereas the souls in the Moon may have been portrayed as vanishing downward into the matter of that body (Par. III.122-123), these pretty clearly travel a great distance upward very rapidly. Dante has now got his logistics under control: the souls that appear in the planets return to the Empyrean once they have completed their mission, which is to instruct Dante.
This is the third and final time Dante uses repetitions of the word dì (see Purg. XXXI.5 and Par. V.122 for identical paired presences of the imperative form of dire) to give a greater sense of intensity to a speaker's urging. The first two times Beatrice is speaking to the protagonist; now Dante speaks to himself, in phrasing that is still more insistent.
The tercet, a dizzying display of alliteration (there are nine d sounds in three lines), also contains a possible pun. Beatrice's “sweet drops” in Italian (dolci stille) sound reasonably like Bonagiunta's new sweet style (dolce stil[e] novo [Purg. XXIV.57]), which he attributes to Dante's poetry in praise of Beatrice. The likelihood of intention behind such a play on words is increased by the presence of the same three rhymes later on in this canto, vv. 53-57 (nodo, ch'i' odo, and modo) as are found in Purgatorio XXIV.53-57. These are the only two occurrences of these constituents of terza rima in the poem; that they occur at the same numerical placemarks (vv. 53, 55, 57) is hardly conclusive evidence, but doesn't hurt the case, either.
For Dante's phrase “dolci stille” (sweet drops), see Massimiliano Chiamenti (Dante Alighieri traduttore [Florence: Le Lettere, 1995], p. 178); see also Selene Sarteschi (“Sant'Agostino in Dante e nell'età di Dante,” in her Per la “Commedia” e non per essa soltanto [Rome: Bulzoni, 2002 {1999}], p. 186), indicating a possible source in Augustine, Confessiones XIII.xxx.45: “Et audivi, domine deus meus, et elinxi stillam dulcedinis ex tua veritate” (And I heard, O Lord my God, and drank up a drop of sweetness out of Thy truth [tr. E.B. Pusey] {italics added}).
In an exerted tercet, the poet says that he bowed his head, under the sway of his devotion to Beatrice, just as does a man who nods off to sleep. For the same phrase, “t'assonna,” see Paradiso XXXII.139. There it precedes the vision of the Godhead, featuring the miracle of the Incarnation. It is perhaps not accidental that this is a central subject in Beatrice's long disquisition that begins at verse 19 and runs the rest of the canto.
Surely what is meant is “any part of her name,” but we may want to reflect that the parts referred to just happen to be the first and the last, mirroring, perhaps, the alpha and omega that represent God. “Bice” was, of course, Beatrice's nickname (see Vita nuova XXIV.8, the ninth line of the sonnet “Io mi senti' svegliar dentro a lo core”: “monna Vanna e monna Bice,” where Dante observes Guido Cavalcanti's lady, Giovanna, preceding his lady, Beatrice.)
Some commentators try to associate the foco with the fires of Hell, but it seems more likely that Dante is saying that Beatrice's smile had the power to calm even one who had been set on fire. And see Purgatorio XXVII.10-54 for Dante's hesitant encounter with the purging flames of the terrace of Lust.
Had not Justinian just spoken at even greater length, this would have been the longest single speech in the poem, extending 130 lines from verse 19 to the end of the canto (148). The passage beginning here is described by Carroll (comm. to vv. 10-66) as “the chief theological discourse in the Paradiso.” All the rest of the canto is, in fact, a Beatricean commentary on two passages in the preceding canto, first (vv. 19-51) Justinian's presentation of Titus's doing “vengeance for vengeance” in his destruction of Jerusalem (Par. VI.91-93), second (vv. 52-120) his previous claim that Tiberius, by having sovereignty when Christ was put to death (Par. VI.89-90), took “vengeance” for God's wrath by presiding over the Crucifixion. It is interesting that Dante makes his two unusual choices for a short list of the most significant Roman emperors the focus of Beatrice's commentary in verse.
This stylistic tour de force (having Beatrice, presented playfully in the fifth canto as the author of the poem [vv. 16-17], now reappear as the commentator on two passages from the sixth canto) is not calculated to set enthusiasts of lyric poetry aflutter. Terza rima is about the only thing poetic that we find in the rest of the canto, as Beatrice's language is Scholastic-sounding and severe, her interests only instructional, and correctively so.
The only other appearance of the word infallibile occurs in Inferno XXIX.56, where it modifies giustizia. Here Beatrice gives her infallible (because she speaks with the authority of her Maker) idea of the justness of God's vengeance, the “negative form” of his justice, punishment.
For a consideration of the way in which Christ's prediction of the fall of Jerusalem (Luke 19:36-46) and the city's conquest by the Romans in A.D. 70 are reflected in this and other passages (and also look forward to the coming punishment of Florence), see Ronald Martinez (“Dante's Jeremiads: The Fall of Jerusalem and the Burden of the New Pharisees, the Capetians, and Florence,” in Dante for the New Millennium, ed. Teodolinda Barolini and H. Wayne Storey [New York: Fordham University Press, 2003], pp. 301-19).
The presence of two words directly related to “justice” in this verse begins by far the largest single deployment in any canto of such words: giusta and giustamente here; giustamente (42); giusta (50 and 51); giuste (84); giustizia (119). The neighboring canto (VI) is tied for second place with four, thus making these two cantos the center of this concern in a poem that is perhaps more concerned with justice than with any other single concept. See the note to Inferno III.4. And now see Patrick Boyde (Human Vices and Human Worth in Dante's “Comedy” [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], Chapter Nine).
Adam's sin of transgression (and it is significant that Dante here is placing on his shoulders the sin of Eve) was what “brought sin into the world and all our woe” (Milton, Paradise Lost I.3), to borrow the words of another major poet's reference to that transgression. It is this for which the Word of God chose, in his love for humankind, to offer Himself as flesh in sacrificial atonement for all sin since Adam. (It was precisely this humanity of Jesus in which Justinian did not at first believe [see Par. VI.13-15].)
Adam was not born; he was created directly by God, as was (almost) Eve.
Scartazzini/Vandelli (comm. on vv. 28-33) point to Monarchia III.iv.14 for the phrase infirmitas peccati (infirmity of sin) as corresponding to the sickness afflicting the human race after Adam's fall.
Later Dante will spell out the exact amount of time that passed between Adam's sin and his redemption, 5232 years. See Paradiso XXVI.118-123.
The “Word of God” is Jesus, as Second Person of the Trinity.
This tercet includes reference to the two other aspects of the triune God, the Sapience represented by the Son having been mentioned in verse 30 (where Beatrice refers to the Word becoming flesh): the Power represented by the Father, “Maker” of all things; the Love represented by the Holy Spirit.
Humankind, a combination of immortal soul and mortal body, as present in Adam and Eve, quickly (for exactly how quickly, see Par. XXVI.139-142) turned from God to sin and was sent out of Eden. If we measure what was done to Christ upon the cross by the enormous burden of sin He took on, His penalty was utterly just; if, on the other hand, we measure the worth of the one who was punished, no greater outrage was ever committed, especially when we consider what He had voluntarily consented to.
The verse repeats, as Benvenuto da Imola (comm. to vv. 34-39) was perhaps the first to realize, Christ's dictum (John 14:6) “Ego sum via, et veritas, et vita” (I am the way, and the truth, and the life). The text continues, “No one comes to the Father unless through me.”
The paired results of Christ's sacrifice are expressed in a chiasmus: The death of Jesus pleased (a) God and (b) the Jews; it caused both (b) the earthquake at the Crucifixion and (a) the opening of Heaven to humankind. The Jews took perverse pleasure at the killing of Jesus for which reason God made the earth shake, expressing His displeasure; at the same time, and of far greater importance, God accepted Jesus' sacrifice and opened Heaven to redeemed humanity.
Beatrice's repetition of the adjective giusta (just) underlines her main concern for Dante, that he understand that God never acts unjustly. She has taken care of his first doubt, which arose from what Justinian said about the reign of Titus.
Next Beatrice turns to the problem that arose for the protagonist in Justinian's remarks about the reign of Tiberius. This is one of the most pernicious stumbling blocks for non-believers and even some Christians. It is the question posed (and answered) by Beatrice here (see Scartazzini's lengthy gloss to this passage, which deals with Dante's complex discussion clearly). The two main sources for Dante's thinking about the justification for the death of Jesus on the cross are, according to Scartazzini, St. Thomas (ST III, q. 46, a. 1-3) and St. Anselm of Canterbury (Cur Deus homo). For insistence on the primacy, for Dante's thinking on this subject, of Anselm's tract, see Fallani (“Il Canto VII” in “Paradiso”: Letture degli anni 1979-81, ed. S. Zennaro [Rome: Bonacci, 1989], pp. 233-34).
Now, reading Dante's mind, Beatrice sees what is troubling him; there must have been some other way for human sin to have been canceled short of having the incarnate Godhead be slain upon a cross. Beatrice warns that her proof will be difficult, because only those nourished over time by the warmth of God's affection ever understand this mystery, i.e, only those inspired by the Holy Spirit are able to understand the love for humankind that impelled Jesus to give up his life for us.
From Lombardi (1791, comm. to vv. 56-57) to Grabher (1934, comm. to vv. 55-63) most commentators think the word pur here means “only.” Starting with Trucchi (1936, comm. to vv. 52-57), the tide begins swinging to proprio (precisely, exactly); Chimenz (1962, comm. to vv. 56-57) prefers this meaning to “only,” as do Bosco/Reggio (1979, comm. to vv. 56-57); as our translation indicates, we do, too.
Tozer's summary of these passages may be helpful: “Man, inasmuch as his soul proceeded direct from God, possessed the gifts of immortality, free will, and likeness to God, and on these depended his high position (vv. 64-78). By the Fall the freedom of his will and his likeness to God were impaired, and his position was lost (vv. 79-81). There were only two ways by which he could recover this, i.e., either (1) that he should make satisfaction himself for his sin, or (2) that God in His mercy should pardon him freely (vv. 82-93). The former of these it was impossible for man to do, because he could not render any adequate recompense; it remained therefore for God to guarantee his pardon (vv. 94-105). This God did in a manner at once most consonant with His own nature, as being perfect Goodness, and most advantageous to man, and most in accordance with the demands of justice. He followed both the way of mercy and the way of justice. By the Incarnation and death of Christ He enabled man to regain his lost position, and at the same time made the satisfaction for his sins which justice required” (vv. 106-20).
For an attempt to demonstrate the closeness of the thought here to that found in Plato's Timaeus, see Fraccaroli (“Dante e il Timeo,” in Il Timeo, tr. Giuseppe Fraccaroli [Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1906], pp. 393-97), disputing the more usual nineteenth-century claim of a dependence upon Boethius. However, see Richard Green's note to the passage, in his translation of the Consolatio (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, ed. O. Piest [New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962], p. 60), pointing out that the poem (“O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas” [O you who govern the world with eternal reason]) in Boethius (Consolatio III.m9) is recognized as being an epitome of the first section of the Timaeus. Among the early commentators, Pietro di Dante (comm to vv. 64-78) cites Boethius (“Rather it was the form of the highest good, existing within You without envy, which caused You to fashion all things according to the external exemplar”), while Benvenuto da Imola (comm. to vv. 64-66) and Francesco da Buti (comm. to vv. 64-75) cite Timaeus 29e (the opening of Book I): “Optimus erat, et ab optimo omnis invidia relegata est” (He [the god who made universal disorder into order] was good: and in the good no jealousy in any matter can ever arise [tr. F.M. Cornford - Plato is speaking of the divine mind, as is Boethius). For more support of Plato's candidacy and general consideration of the problem, see Cesare Galimberti (“Canto VII,” in Lectura Dantis Scaligera: “Paradiso”, dir. M. Marcazzan [Florence: Le Monnier, 1968], pp. 227-35). Sapegno (comm. to vv. 64-66) was perhaps the first to cite both (Boethius, Cons. III.m9.1-6; Plato, Tim. I). Giacalone (comm. to vv. 64-66) offers helpful discussion and bibliography.
Those things created directly, i.e., without mediation, by God include the angels, the heavenly spheres, unformed matter (e.g., the earth's surface, awaiting the formal intervention of God to be given its definitive shape), and the rational part of the tripartite human soul. For the distinction between this unformed God-created matter, Augustine's materia informis, and “prime matter” (materia prima), see David O'Keeffe (“Dante's Theory of Creation,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 26 [1924], pp. 51-57).
That which God creates unmediated is eternal and unvarying.
The “more recent” things were created, not directly by God, but with some mediation (e.g., planetary influence), since all of these were part of a “secondary creation.”
In Adam, we all sinned, and have been denied the privileges that once were his, particularly three things: immortality, the earthly paradise, and our resemblance to God.
We were not capable of abasing ourselves in humility deep enough to make up for the amount we had risen up in pride.
Thus it remained for God to ransom us using either mercy or justice. He elected to employ both of these.
Dante employs hysteron proteron yet again to mark either end of human history, the last night of life on earth (see the Apocalypse) and the first day (see Genesis). In the period of time sectored in that arc no greater act ever was or shall be than Jesus' act of self-humiliation to save humankind.
This passage and the rest of the canto deal with the ontology of God's creation, specifically the distinctions between the nature of being in that which is created directly by God (things eternal or, more properly, since they have a beginning in time, sempiternal) and in that which, though created by God (for nothing that exists owes or can owe its existence to any other first cause), has other participation in its making (i.e., they are made by the intervention of other already existent things, as are almost all things that we encounter: butterflies, the cliffs of Dover, rain). On this question see Moore's late essay, “Dante's Theory of Creation” (Studies in Dante, Fourth Series: Textual Criticism of the “Convivio” and Miscellaneous Essays [Oxford: Clarendon, 1968 {1917}], pp. 134-65), and the stern response by David O'Keeffe (“Dante's Theory of Creation,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 26 [1924]; Moevs' discussion (The Metaphysics of Dante's “Comedy” [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], pp. 122-26), agrees with O'Keeffe's objections to Moore's formulations, which underlie many later (mis-)understandings of the basic cosmic views put forward here by Beatrice, and which, as a result, are incorrect. As Moevs points out (pp. 123-24), Beatrice fears lest Dante, mistaking her words at vv. 67-69, fail to distinguish between primary creation (i.e., directly by God) and secondary creation (God acting in collaboration with other agents). As Moevs rightly insists, for Dante there is no such thing as creation independent of God; but there is (1) direct creation and (2) indirect creation; in the latter other agents besides the deity have a role. All such entities, Beatrice concludes, are “mortal,” including the four elements. This passage is not made easier by its frequent use of the past participle of the verb creare. The word creature at verse 127 has the sense of “things created” (by God). But this, mirroring the protagonist's confusion, blurs the crucial distinction that Beatrice will make; all things are created by God, some few directly (and they are eternal or, to use the correct term, sempiternal) but most parts of the made universe, as the four elements, indirectly. At verse 131 creati also refers to divine creation, but this time (and for the only time in this passage) of direct creation by God, and hence of eternal things, both angels and the heavenly spheres. In verse 135 creata refers to the secondary creation of the informative power in the stars, as it does in both of its iterations in vv. 136 and 137. The text could not be clearer, but its use of the same term, creare, for both kinds of creation, primary and secondary (i.e., direct and indirect), makes a reader's task more difficult.
This is the second consecutive canto in which Dante has not spoken (he is in fact silent from Par. V.129 until Par. VIII.44 [for his considerably longer period of abstention from speech, see Par. IX.81-Par. XIV.96]. In this canto his suppressed speech is reported (but not uttered) at vv. 10-12 and Beatrice speaks his doubt for him in vv. 55-57 and then once more here in this passage.
For a paraphrase of the first tercet, see Tozer (comm. to vv. 139-141): “From speaking of things without life Beatrice passes to those which possess the sensitive or the vegetative life without the rational soul. These also are not incorruptible, because their life is produced mediately by the influence of the stars, acting on those elements of their nature (i.e., of the matter of which they are composed) which are capable of being affected by them. 'The brightness and the motion of the holy lights (the stars) draws forth the life of brutes and plants from the combination of elements (complession) in them, which is endued with power (potenziata) thereto,' i.e., to be so affected. Complession in its technical use means 'a combination of elements,' e.g., of humours of the body, or properties of matter.” And see Moevs (The Metaphysics of Dante's “Comedy” [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], p. 125), on this passage: “The souls of all plants and animals are 'drawn from' varying compounds of the sublunar elements (complession potenzïata) by the influence of the stars, but human life (the human intelligence or rational soul) 'breathes directly' from the 'supreme beneficence,' from Intellect-Being itself. That is why the human mind or soul is always in love with, and never ceases to seek union with, the ground of its being, of all being.”
Christian Moevs (The Metaphysics of Dante's “Comedy” [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], pp. 130-132), points out an error underpinning some commentators' responses to the Dantean formulation of a central theological issue in this canto: the corruptibility of the first bodies given to humankind directly by God. Their usual position is that this body, created as home of the soul in both Adam and Eve, was incorruptible; thus its “true nature” is incorruptible, despite original sin; with resurrection we regain that incorruptible body. But what, we may ask, of the damned? Clearly their bodies are not of the incorruptible kind, since the damned all-too-painfully recollect the corruptions of the body and live repeating them eternally, as we have seen often enough in Inferno. That is a negative argument, if perhaps a useful one. Moreover, and as Moevs, following O'Keeffe (“Dante's Theory of Creation,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 26 [1924], pp. 61-62), points out, the argument is heretical on its own terms. No Christian authority ever said that the human body was eternal, even in its original Edenic condition (but exacty this opinion is found among some commentators; see, e.g., Fallani [“Il Canto VII” in “Paradiso”: Letture degli anni 1979-81, ed. S. Zennaro {Rome: Bonacci, 1989}, p. 236], holding that it is indeed immortal). And so the question arises: Will we be given what we originally had, a corruptible body washed clean of its sins (unlike the maculate body that is the property of anyone damned), as our soul has been? Or will we receive a truly incorruptible body? In one way of understanding, the body has always been, and always will be, corruptible (even if, resurrected, it will not decay any more). To triumph in it is also to triumph over it. Moevs concludes his treatment of this problematic passage as follows (p. 132): “Beatrice has re-expressed the great Clementine dictum that God became man so that man may learn from man how to become God.” But see Paul's discussion of the raising of the dead in I Corinthians 15:35-54, which certainly seems to promise incorruptible flesh to those who participate in the general resurrection.
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“Osanna, sanctus Deus sabaòth,
superillustrans claritate tua
felices ignes horum malacòth!”
Così, volgendosi a la nota sua,
fu viso a me cantare essa sustanza,
sopra la qual doppio lume s'addua;
ed essa e l'altre mossero a sua danza,
e quasi velocissime faville
mi si velar di sùbita distanza.
Io dubitava e dicea “Dille, dille!”
fra me, “dille” dicea, “a la mia donna
che mi diseta con le dolci stille.”
Ma quella reverenza che s'indonna
di tutto me, pur per Be e per ice,
mi richinava come l'uom ch'assonna.
Poco sofferse me cotal Beatrice
e cominciò, raggiandomi d'un riso
tal, che nel foco faria l'uom felice:
“Secondo mio infallibile avviso,
come giusta vendetta giustamente
punita fosse, t'ha in pensier miso;
ma io ti solverò tosto la mente;
e tu ascolta, ché le mie parole
di gran sentenza ti faran presente.
Per non soffrire a la virtù che vole
freno a suo prode, quell' uom che non nacque,
dannando sé, dannò tutta sua prole;
onde l'umana specie inferma giacque
giù per secoli molti in grande errore,
fin ch'al Verbo di Dio discender piacque
u' la natura, che dal suo fattore
s'era allungata, unì a sé in persona
con l'atto sol del suo etterno amore.
Or drizza il viso a quel ch'or si ragiona:
questa natura al suo fattore unita,
qual fu creata, fu sincera e buona;
ma per sé stessa pur fu ella sbandita
di paradiso, però che si torse
da via di verità e da sua vita.
La pena dunque che la croce porse
s'a la natura assunta si misura,
nulla già mai sì giustamente morse;
e così nulla fu di tanta ingiura,
guardando a la persona che sofferse,
in che era contratta tal natura.
Però d'un atto uscir cose diverse:
ch'a Dio e a' Giudei piacque una morte;
per lei tremò la terra e 'l ciel s'aperse.
Non ti dee oramai parer più forte,
quando si dice che giusta vendetta
poscia vengiata fu da giusta corte.
Ma io veggi' or la tua mente ristretta
di pensiero in pensier dentro ad un nodo,
del qual con gran disio solver s'aspetta.
Tu dici: 'Ben discerno ciò ch'i' odo;
ma perché Dio volesse, m'è occulto,
a nostra redenzion pur questo modo.'
Questo decreto, frate, sta sepulto
a li occhi di ciascuno il cui ingegno
ne la fiamma d'amor non è adulto.
Veramente, però ch'a questo segno
molto si mira e poco si discerne,
dirò perché tal modo fu più degno.
La divina bontà, che da sé sperne
ogne livore, ardendo in sé, sfavilla
sì che dispiega le bellezze etterne.
Ciò che da lei sanza mezzo distilla
non ha poi fine, perché non si move
la sua imprenta quand' ella sigilla.
Ciò che da essa sanza mezzo piove
libero è tutto, perché non soggiace
a la virtute de le cose nove.
Più l'è conforme, e però più le piace;
ché l'ardor santo ch'ogne cosa raggia,
ne la più somigliante è più vivace.
Di tutte queste dote s'avvantaggia
l'umana creatura, e s'una manca,
di sua nobilità convien che caggia.
Solo il peccato è quel che la disfranca
e falla dissimìle al sommo bene,
per che del lume suo poco s'imbianca;
e in sua dignità mai non rivene,
se non rïempie, dove colpa vòta,
contra mal dilettar con giuste pene.
Vostra natura, quando peccò tota
nel seme suo, da queste dignitadi,
come di paradiso, fu remota;
né ricovrar potiensi, se tu badi
ben sottilmente, per alcuna via,
sanza passar per un di questi guadi:
o che Dio solo per sua cortesia
dimesso avesse, o che l'uom per sé isso
avesse sodisfatto a sua follia.
Ficca mo l'occhio per entro l'abisso
de l'etterno consiglio, quanto puoi
al mio parlar distrettamente fisso.
Non potea l'uomo ne' termini suoi
mai sodisfar, per non potere ir giuso
con umiltate obedïendo poi,
quanto disobediendo intese ir suso;
e questa è la cagion per che l'uom fue
da poter sodisfar per sé dischiuso.
Dunque a Dio convenia con le vie sue
riparar l'omo a sua intera vita,
dico con l'una, o ver con amendue.
Ma perché l'ovra tanto è più gradita
da l'operante, quanto più appresenta
de la bontà del core ond' ell' è uscita
la divina bontà che 'l mondo imprenta,
di proceder per tutte le sue vie,
a rilevarvi suso, fu contenta.
Né tra l'ultima notte e 'l primo die
sì alto o sì magnifico processo,
o per l'una o per l'altra, fu o fie:
ché più largo fu Dio a dar sé stesso
per far l'uom sufficiente a rilevarsi,
che s'elli avesse sol da sé dimesso;
e tutti li altri modi erano scarsi
a la giustizia, se 'l Figliuol di Dio
non fosse umilïato ad incarnarsi.
Or per empierti bene ogne disio,
ritorno a dichiararti in alcun loco,
perché tu veggi lì così com' io.
Tu dici: 'Io veggio l'acqua, io veggio il foco,
l'aere e la terra e tutte lor misture
venire a corruzione, e durar poco;
e queste cose pur furon creature;
per che, se ciò ch'è detto è stato vero,
esser dovrien da corruzion sicure.'
Li angeli, frate, e 'l paese sincero
nel qual tu se', dir si posson creati,
sì come sono, in loro essere intero;
ma li alimenti che tu hai nomati
e quelle cose che di lor si fanno
da creata virtù sono informati.
Creata fu la materia ch'elli hanno;
creata fu la virtù informante
in queste stelle che 'ntorno a lor vanno.
L'anima d'ogne bruto e de le piante
di complession potenzïata tira
lo raggio e 'l moto de le luci sante;
ma vostra vita sanza mezzo spira
la somma beninanza, e la innamora
di sé sì che poi sempre la disira.
E quinci puoi argomentare ancora
vostra resurrezion, se tu ripensi
come l'umana carne fessi allora
che li primi parenti intrambo fensi.”
"Osanna sanctus Deus Sabaoth,
Superillustrans claritate tua
Felices ignes horum malahoth!"
In this wise, to his melody returning,
This substance, upon which a double light
Doubles itself, was seen by me to sing,
And to their dance this and the others moved,
And in the manner of swift-hurrying sparks
Veiled themselves from me with a sudden distance.
Doubting was I, and saying, "Tell her, tell her,"
Within me, "tell her," saying, "tell my Lady,"
Who slakes my thirst with her sweet effluences;
And yet that reverence which doth lord it over
The whole of me only by B and ICE,
Bowed me again like unto one who drowses.
Short while did Beatrice endure me thus;
And she began, lighting me with a smile
Such as would make one happy in the fire:
"According to infallible advisement,
After what manner a just vengeance justly
Could be avenged has put thee upon thinking,
But I will speedily thy mind unloose;
And do thou listen, for these words of mine
Of a great doctrine will a present make thee.
By not enduring on the power that wills
Curb for his good, that man who ne'er was born,
Damning himself damned all his progeny;
Whereby the human species down below
Lay sick for many centuries in great error,
Till to descend it pleased the Word of God
To where the nature, which from its own Maker
Estranged itself, he joined to him in person
By the sole act of his eternal love.
Now unto what is said direct thy sight;
This nature when united to its Maker,
Such as created, was sincere and good;
But by itself alone was banished forth
From Paradise, because it turned aside
Out of the way of truth and of its life.
Therefore the penalty the cross held out,
If measured by the nature thus assumed,
None ever yet with so great justice stung,
And none was ever of so great injustice,
Considering who the Person was that suffered,
Within whom such a nature was contracted.
From one act therefore issued things diverse;
To God and to the Jews one death was pleasing;
Earth trembled at it and the Heaven was opened.
It should no longer now seem difficult
To thee, when it is said that a just vengeance
By a just court was afterward avenged.
But now do I behold thy mind entangled
From thought to thought within a knot, from which
With great desire it waits to free itself.
Thou sayest, 'Well discern I what I hear;
But it is hidden from me why God willed
For our redemption only this one mode.'
Buried remaineth, brother, this decree
Unto the eyes of every one whose nature
Is in the flame of love not yet adult.
Verily, inasmuch as at this mark
One gazes long and little is discerned,
Wherefore this mode was worthiest will I say.
Goodness Divine, which from itself doth spurn
All envy, burning in itself so sparkles
That the eternal beauties it unfolds.
Whate'er from this immediately distils
Has afterwards no end, for ne'er removed
Is its impression when it sets its seal.
Whate'er from this immediately rains down
Is wholly free, because it is not subject
Unto the influences of novel things.
The more conformed thereto, the more it pleases;
For the blest ardour that irradiates all things
In that most like itself is most vivacious.
With all of these things has advantaged been
The human creature; and if one be wanting,
From his nobility he needs must fall.
'Tis sin alone which doth disfranchise him,
And render him unlike the Good Supreme,
So that he little with its light is blanched,
And to his dignity no more returns,
Unless he fill up where transgression empties
With righteous pains for criminal delights.
Your nature when it sinned so utterly
In its own seed, out of these dignities
Even as out of Paradise was driven,
Nor could itself recover, if thou notest
With nicest subtilty, by any way,
Except by passing one of these two fords:
Either that God through clemency alone
Had pardon granted, or that man himself
Had satisfaction for his folly made.
Fix now thine eye deep into the abyss
Of the eternal counsel, to my speech
As far as may be fastened steadfastly!
Man in his limitations had not power
To satisfy, not having power to sink
In his humility obeying then,
Far as he disobeying thought to rise;
And for this reason man has been from power
Of satisfying by himself excluded.
Therefore it God behoved in his own ways
Man to restore unto his perfect life,
I say in one, or else in both of them.
But since the action of the doer is
So much more grateful, as it more presents
The goodness of the heart from which it issues,
Goodness Divine, that doth imprint the world,
Has been contented to proceed by each
And all its ways to lift you up again;
Nor 'twixt the first day and the final night
Such high and such magnificent proceeding
By one or by the other was or shall be;
For God more bounteous was himself to give
To make man able to uplift himself,
Than if he only of himself had pardoned;
And all the other modes were insufficient
For justice, were it not the Son of God
Himself had humbled to become incarnate.
Now, to fill fully each desire of thine,
Return I to elucidate one place,
In order that thou there mayst see as I do.
Thou sayst: 'I see the air, I see the fire,
The water, and the earth, and all their mixtures
Come to corruption, and short while endure;
And these things notwithstanding were created;'
Therefore if that which I have said were true,
They should have been secure against corruption.
The Angels, brother, and the land sincere
In which thou art, created may be called
Just as they are in their entire existence;
But all the elements which thou hast named,
And all those things which out of them are made,
By a created virtue are informed.
Created was the matter which they have;
Created was the informing influence
Within these stars that round about them go.
The soul of every brute and of the plants
By its potential temperament attracts
The ray and motion of the holy lights;
But your own life immediately inspires
Supreme Beneficence, and enamours it
So with herself, it evermore desires her.
And thou from this mayst argue furthermore
Your resurrection, if thou think again
How human flesh was fashioned at that time
When the first parents both of them were made."
If one were to select a single passage from the entire Commedia that seems most self-consciously wrought and thoroughly marked by poetic exuberance, it might be difficult to find one more fitting that description than this, with its opening mixture of Hebrew and Latin, the mysterious “double light” glowing upon Justinian, the sudden departure of that soul and his dancing fellows, the protagonist's wild excitement in his bafflement over a theological question, and, finally, the linguistic playfulness of the poet's reference to Beatrice's name. It is as though Dante were apologizing in advance for the lack of poetic energy that typifies the rest of the canto, turned over to the theological needs of its protagonist as ministered to by his guide.
Canto VII almost seems to be offered as reassurance to readers with a religious and/or theological bent that we've closed the books on Roman history and Italian politics and now will stick to our good Christian knitting - for a while, at least. However, for the imperial resonances in the opening three terzine, see Giovanni Fallani (“Il Canto VII” in “Paradiso”: Letture degli anni 1979-81, ed. S. Zennaro [Rome: Bonacci, 1989], pp. 224-27).
See Tozer's translation and note (comm. to vv. 1-3): “'Hosanna, holy God of hosts, who by Thy brightness dost illuminate from above the happy fires of these realms.' These verses appear to have been Dante's own, not a hymn of the Church; but they are in Latin, to correspond to other mediaeval hymns. malacoth: as Dante required a rhyme for Sabaoth – no easy thing to find – he availed himself of the word malachoth, which he met with in St. Jerome's Preface to the Vulgate, where it is translated by regnorum (realms). The proper form of this, which is read in modern editions of the Vulgate, is mamlachot, but in Dante's time malachoth was the accepted reading.”
For glossolalia (“speaking in tongues”) as a concern to Dante, see Hollander (Dante and Paul's “five words with understanding,” Occasional Papers, No. 1, Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Texts and Studies [Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1992)]. And see Giuseppe Di Scipio (The Presence of Pauline Thought in the Works of Dante [Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995], p. 281) for another assertion that Inferno VII.1 is a parodic version of glossolalia. Sarolli, who almost gets credit for being the first writer to connect, in an oppositional relation, the first lines of this canto with those of the seventh canto of Inferno, “Pape Satàn, pape Satàn, aleppe!” (Prolegomena alla “Divina Commedia” [Florence: Olschki, 1971], pp. 289-90), also unaccountably urges a reader to understand that the macaronic passage includes, not only Hebrew and Latin, but Greek. (Tommaseo, in passing, does mention Inf. VII.1 in conjunction with the opening of Par. VII, thus depriving Sarolli of an honor he merits, since Tommaseo makes no effort to deal with the significance of the phenomenon he has observed.)
See the note to.Paradiso V.1. This is the third consecutive canto that begins with a speaker's voice (rather than narration) and the second consecutive canto to begin with the same speaker's voice, both of these phenomena unique occurrences.
Justinian's first word of his last speech, Osanna, has a history in the poem: see Purgatorio XI.11 and XXIX.51. After this appearance, it also appears in Paradiso VIII.29; XXVIII.118; XXXII.135. Its six appearances make it the most present “foreign” word in the poem. The Ottimo hears its resonance from the shouts for the entry of Jesus into Jerusalem (e.g., John. 12:13); Benvenuto, discussing (comm. to Par. VIII.22-30) the word's appearance in Paradiso VIII.29 has this to say: “Ista vox hebraica significat immensam affectionem mentis quae non potest bene exprimi graece vel latine” (This Hebrew word signifies immense mental affection which cannot be properly expressed either in Greek or in Latin). The second Hebrew word in this line, sabaòth, is genitive plural “of the armies” (or “hosts,” as Tozer translates, an English version of Latin hostis [enemy], but without its sense of opposition).
For the program of song in the last cantica, see the note to Paradiso XXI.58-60.
God is depicted as shining down from above and illumining these saved souls who, along with Justinian, have appeared to Dante in Mercury in the moments before they withdraw from Dante's presence.
Justinian is now presented as a “substance,” an irreducible human soul, singing this holy song. We perhaps now understand why Dante has gone to such lengths to associate the emperor, inspired keeper of the Roman laws, and himself, inspired poet of empire, in the preceding canto (see Par. VI.11; VI.23; VI.88); their tasks are not dissimilar.
The neologism s'addua is problematic. Readers are divided as to what exactly the double light represents, and there are widely various opinions. Mazzoni (“Il canto VI del Paradiso,” Letture classensi 9-10 [1982]: 142), suggests that these lights are, the one, earthly, the other, heavenly, that is, the emperor's past and present identities. Bosco/Reggio (comm. to this verse) are of the opinion that the lights are of the warrior and of the legislator. However, as we have seen in the preceding canto, Justinian seems most eager to put the military life behind him (Par. VI.25-27); thus it would be strange for Dante to treat him in such wise. And see Rachel Jacoff (“Sacrifice and Empire: Thematic Analogies in San Vitale and the Paradiso,” in Renaissance Studies in Honor of Craig Hugh Smyth, ed. Andrew Morrogh et al. [Florence: Giunti Barbèra, 1985], pp. 323-24), arguing for Virgil's phrase “geminas... flammas,” the description of Augustus at the helm during the battle of Actium, his brows casting a double flame, as he is portrayed on the shield of Aeneas (Aen. VIII.680, part of the same passage visited in the last canto: see the note to Par. VI.79-81). That seems a promising lead to follow. However, it would probably be strange for Dante to have “borrowed” Augustus's identity for Justinian. There is also a possibility that Dante is thinking of the passage in Acts 2:3-4 in which the apostles are given the gift of glossolalia. There appeared to them cloven tongues of fire; these settled on each of them; they were then filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak such languages as the Spirit gave them to utter. That is possibly reflected in what has been occurring in the opening lines of Canto VII; however, there may be a problem with the “dispertitae linguae tanquam ignis,” which may not be all that well described by the phrase “doppio lume.”
Bosco/Reggio point out that “s'addua” (inflected form of the verb coined by Dante, adduarsi) will soon be joined by such other numerical coinages as incinquarsi (Par. IX.40) and intrearsi (Par. XIII.57).
Whereas the souls in the Moon may have been portrayed as vanishing downward into the matter of that body (Par. III.122-123), these pretty clearly travel a great distance upward very rapidly. Dante has now got his logistics under control: the souls that appear in the planets return to the Empyrean once they have completed their mission, which is to instruct Dante.
This is the third and final time Dante uses repetitions of the word dì (see Purg. XXXI.5 and Par. V.122 for identical paired presences of the imperative form of dire) to give a greater sense of intensity to a speaker's urging. The first two times Beatrice is speaking to the protagonist; now Dante speaks to himself, in phrasing that is still more insistent.
The tercet, a dizzying display of alliteration (there are nine d sounds in three lines), also contains a possible pun. Beatrice's “sweet drops” in Italian (dolci stille) sound reasonably like Bonagiunta's new sweet style (dolce stil[e] novo [Purg. XXIV.57]), which he attributes to Dante's poetry in praise of Beatrice. The likelihood of intention behind such a play on words is increased by the presence of the same three rhymes later on in this canto, vv. 53-57 (nodo, ch'i' odo, and modo) as are found in Purgatorio XXIV.53-57. These are the only two occurrences of these constituents of terza rima in the poem; that they occur at the same numerical placemarks (vv. 53, 55, 57) is hardly conclusive evidence, but doesn't hurt the case, either.
For Dante's phrase “dolci stille” (sweet drops), see Massimiliano Chiamenti (Dante Alighieri traduttore [Florence: Le Lettere, 1995], p. 178); see also Selene Sarteschi (“Sant'Agostino in Dante e nell'età di Dante,” in her Per la “Commedia” e non per essa soltanto [Rome: Bulzoni, 2002 {1999}], p. 186), indicating a possible source in Augustine, Confessiones XIII.xxx.45: “Et audivi, domine deus meus, et elinxi stillam dulcedinis ex tua veritate” (And I heard, O Lord my God, and drank up a drop of sweetness out of Thy truth [tr. E.B. Pusey] {italics added}).
In an exerted tercet, the poet says that he bowed his head, under the sway of his devotion to Beatrice, just as does a man who nods off to sleep. For the same phrase, “t'assonna,” see Paradiso XXXII.139. There it precedes the vision of the Godhead, featuring the miracle of the Incarnation. It is perhaps not accidental that this is a central subject in Beatrice's long disquisition that begins at verse 19 and runs the rest of the canto.
Surely what is meant is “any part of her name,” but we may want to reflect that the parts referred to just happen to be the first and the last, mirroring, perhaps, the alpha and omega that represent God. “Bice” was, of course, Beatrice's nickname (see Vita nuova XXIV.8, the ninth line of the sonnet “Io mi senti' svegliar dentro a lo core”: “monna Vanna e monna Bice,” where Dante observes Guido Cavalcanti's lady, Giovanna, preceding his lady, Beatrice.)
Some commentators try to associate the foco with the fires of Hell, but it seems more likely that Dante is saying that Beatrice's smile had the power to calm even one who had been set on fire. And see Purgatorio XXVII.10-54 for Dante's hesitant encounter with the purging flames of the terrace of Lust.
Had not Justinian just spoken at even greater length, this would have been the longest single speech in the poem, extending 130 lines from verse 19 to the end of the canto (148). The passage beginning here is described by Carroll (comm. to vv. 10-66) as “the chief theological discourse in the Paradiso.” All the rest of the canto is, in fact, a Beatricean commentary on two passages in the preceding canto, first (vv. 19-51) Justinian's presentation of Titus's doing “vengeance for vengeance” in his destruction of Jerusalem (Par. VI.91-93), second (vv. 52-120) his previous claim that Tiberius, by having sovereignty when Christ was put to death (Par. VI.89-90), took “vengeance” for God's wrath by presiding over the Crucifixion. It is interesting that Dante makes his two unusual choices for a short list of the most significant Roman emperors the focus of Beatrice's commentary in verse.
This stylistic tour de force (having Beatrice, presented playfully in the fifth canto as the author of the poem [vv. 16-17], now reappear as the commentator on two passages from the sixth canto) is not calculated to set enthusiasts of lyric poetry aflutter. Terza rima is about the only thing poetic that we find in the rest of the canto, as Beatrice's language is Scholastic-sounding and severe, her interests only instructional, and correctively so.
The only other appearance of the word infallibile occurs in Inferno XXIX.56, where it modifies giustizia. Here Beatrice gives her infallible (because she speaks with the authority of her Maker) idea of the justness of God's vengeance, the “negative form” of his justice, punishment.
For a consideration of the way in which Christ's prediction of the fall of Jerusalem (Luke 19:36-46) and the city's conquest by the Romans in A.D. 70 are reflected in this and other passages (and also look forward to the coming punishment of Florence), see Ronald Martinez (“Dante's Jeremiads: The Fall of Jerusalem and the Burden of the New Pharisees, the Capetians, and Florence,” in Dante for the New Millennium, ed. Teodolinda Barolini and H. Wayne Storey [New York: Fordham University Press, 2003], pp. 301-19).
The presence of two words directly related to “justice” in this verse begins by far the largest single deployment in any canto of such words: giusta and giustamente here; giustamente (42); giusta (50 and 51); giuste (84); giustizia (119). The neighboring canto (VI) is tied for second place with four, thus making these two cantos the center of this concern in a poem that is perhaps more concerned with justice than with any other single concept. See the note to Inferno III.4. And now see Patrick Boyde (Human Vices and Human Worth in Dante's “Comedy” [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], Chapter Nine).
Adam's sin of transgression (and it is significant that Dante here is placing on his shoulders the sin of Eve) was what “brought sin into the world and all our woe” (Milton, Paradise Lost I.3), to borrow the words of another major poet's reference to that transgression. It is this for which the Word of God chose, in his love for humankind, to offer Himself as flesh in sacrificial atonement for all sin since Adam. (It was precisely this humanity of Jesus in which Justinian did not at first believe [see Par. VI.13-15].)
Adam was not born; he was created directly by God, as was (almost) Eve.
Scartazzini/Vandelli (comm. on vv. 28-33) point to Monarchia III.iv.14 for the phrase infirmitas peccati (infirmity of sin) as corresponding to the sickness afflicting the human race after Adam's fall.
Later Dante will spell out the exact amount of time that passed between Adam's sin and his redemption, 5232 years. See Paradiso XXVI.118-123.
The “Word of God” is Jesus, as Second Person of the Trinity.
This tercet includes reference to the two other aspects of the triune God, the Sapience represented by the Son having been mentioned in verse 30 (where Beatrice refers to the Word becoming flesh): the Power represented by the Father, “Maker” of all things; the Love represented by the Holy Spirit.
Humankind, a combination of immortal soul and mortal body, as present in Adam and Eve, quickly (for exactly how quickly, see Par. XXVI.139-142) turned from God to sin and was sent out of Eden. If we measure what was done to Christ upon the cross by the enormous burden of sin He took on, His penalty was utterly just; if, on the other hand, we measure the worth of the one who was punished, no greater outrage was ever committed, especially when we consider what He had voluntarily consented to.
The verse repeats, as Benvenuto da Imola (comm. to vv. 34-39) was perhaps the first to realize, Christ's dictum (John 14:6) “Ego sum via, et veritas, et vita” (I am the way, and the truth, and the life). The text continues, “No one comes to the Father unless through me.”
The paired results of Christ's sacrifice are expressed in a chiasmus: The death of Jesus pleased (a) God and (b) the Jews; it caused both (b) the earthquake at the Crucifixion and (a) the opening of Heaven to humankind. The Jews took perverse pleasure at the killing of Jesus for which reason God made the earth shake, expressing His displeasure; at the same time, and of far greater importance, God accepted Jesus' sacrifice and opened Heaven to redeemed humanity.
Beatrice's repetition of the adjective giusta (just) underlines her main concern for Dante, that he understand that God never acts unjustly. She has taken care of his first doubt, which arose from what Justinian said about the reign of Titus.
Next Beatrice turns to the problem that arose for the protagonist in Justinian's remarks about the reign of Tiberius. This is one of the most pernicious stumbling blocks for non-believers and even some Christians. It is the question posed (and answered) by Beatrice here (see Scartazzini's lengthy gloss to this passage, which deals with Dante's complex discussion clearly). The two main sources for Dante's thinking about the justification for the death of Jesus on the cross are, according to Scartazzini, St. Thomas (ST III, q. 46, a. 1-3) and St. Anselm of Canterbury (Cur Deus homo). For insistence on the primacy, for Dante's thinking on this subject, of Anselm's tract, see Fallani (“Il Canto VII” in “Paradiso”: Letture degli anni 1979-81, ed. S. Zennaro [Rome: Bonacci, 1989], pp. 233-34).
Now, reading Dante's mind, Beatrice sees what is troubling him; there must have been some other way for human sin to have been canceled short of having the incarnate Godhead be slain upon a cross. Beatrice warns that her proof will be difficult, because only those nourished over time by the warmth of God's affection ever understand this mystery, i.e, only those inspired by the Holy Spirit are able to understand the love for humankind that impelled Jesus to give up his life for us.
From Lombardi (1791, comm. to vv. 56-57) to Grabher (1934, comm. to vv. 55-63) most commentators think the word pur here means “only.” Starting with Trucchi (1936, comm. to vv. 52-57), the tide begins swinging to proprio (precisely, exactly); Chimenz (1962, comm. to vv. 56-57) prefers this meaning to “only,” as do Bosco/Reggio (1979, comm. to vv. 56-57); as our translation indicates, we do, too.
Tozer's summary of these passages may be helpful: “Man, inasmuch as his soul proceeded direct from God, possessed the gifts of immortality, free will, and likeness to God, and on these depended his high position (vv. 64-78). By the Fall the freedom of his will and his likeness to God were impaired, and his position was lost (vv. 79-81). There were only two ways by which he could recover this, i.e., either (1) that he should make satisfaction himself for his sin, or (2) that God in His mercy should pardon him freely (vv. 82-93). The former of these it was impossible for man to do, because he could not render any adequate recompense; it remained therefore for God to guarantee his pardon (vv. 94-105). This God did in a manner at once most consonant with His own nature, as being perfect Goodness, and most advantageous to man, and most in accordance with the demands of justice. He followed both the way of mercy and the way of justice. By the Incarnation and death of Christ He enabled man to regain his lost position, and at the same time made the satisfaction for his sins which justice required” (vv. 106-20).
For an attempt to demonstrate the closeness of the thought here to that found in Plato's Timaeus, see Fraccaroli (“Dante e il Timeo,” in Il Timeo, tr. Giuseppe Fraccaroli [Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1906], pp. 393-97), disputing the more usual nineteenth-century claim of a dependence upon Boethius. However, see Richard Green's note to the passage, in his translation of the Consolatio (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, ed. O. Piest [New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962], p. 60), pointing out that the poem (“O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas” [O you who govern the world with eternal reason]) in Boethius (Consolatio III.m9) is recognized as being an epitome of the first section of the Timaeus. Among the early commentators, Pietro di Dante (comm to vv. 64-78) cites Boethius (“Rather it was the form of the highest good, existing within You without envy, which caused You to fashion all things according to the external exemplar”), while Benvenuto da Imola (comm. to vv. 64-66) and Francesco da Buti (comm. to vv. 64-75) cite Timaeus 29e (the opening of Book I): “Optimus erat, et ab optimo omnis invidia relegata est” (He [the god who made universal disorder into order] was good: and in the good no jealousy in any matter can ever arise [tr. F.M. Cornford - Plato is speaking of the divine mind, as is Boethius). For more support of Plato's candidacy and general consideration of the problem, see Cesare Galimberti (“Canto VII,” in Lectura Dantis Scaligera: “Paradiso”, dir. M. Marcazzan [Florence: Le Monnier, 1968], pp. 227-35). Sapegno (comm. to vv. 64-66) was perhaps the first to cite both (Boethius, Cons. III.m9.1-6; Plato, Tim. I). Giacalone (comm. to vv. 64-66) offers helpful discussion and bibliography.
Those things created directly, i.e., without mediation, by God include the angels, the heavenly spheres, unformed matter (e.g., the earth's surface, awaiting the formal intervention of God to be given its definitive shape), and the rational part of the tripartite human soul. For the distinction between this unformed God-created matter, Augustine's materia informis, and “prime matter” (materia prima), see David O'Keeffe (“Dante's Theory of Creation,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 26 [1924], pp. 51-57).
That which God creates unmediated is eternal and unvarying.
The “more recent” things were created, not directly by God, but with some mediation (e.g., planetary influence), since all of these were part of a “secondary creation.”
In Adam, we all sinned, and have been denied the privileges that once were his, particularly three things: immortality, the earthly paradise, and our resemblance to God.
We were not capable of abasing ourselves in humility deep enough to make up for the amount we had risen up in pride.
Thus it remained for God to ransom us using either mercy or justice. He elected to employ both of these.
Dante employs hysteron proteron yet again to mark either end of human history, the last night of life on earth (see the Apocalypse) and the first day (see Genesis). In the period of time sectored in that arc no greater act ever was or shall be than Jesus' act of self-humiliation to save humankind.
This passage and the rest of the canto deal with the ontology of God's creation, specifically the distinctions between the nature of being in that which is created directly by God (things eternal or, more properly, since they have a beginning in time, sempiternal) and in that which, though created by God (for nothing that exists owes or can owe its existence to any other first cause), has other participation in its making (i.e., they are made by the intervention of other already existent things, as are almost all things that we encounter: butterflies, the cliffs of Dover, rain). On this question see Moore's late essay, “Dante's Theory of Creation” (Studies in Dante, Fourth Series: Textual Criticism of the “Convivio” and Miscellaneous Essays [Oxford: Clarendon, 1968 {1917}], pp. 134-65), and the stern response by David O'Keeffe (“Dante's Theory of Creation,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 26 [1924]; Moevs' discussion (The Metaphysics of Dante's “Comedy” [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], pp. 122-26), agrees with O'Keeffe's objections to Moore's formulations, which underlie many later (mis-)understandings of the basic cosmic views put forward here by Beatrice, and which, as a result, are incorrect. As Moevs points out (pp. 123-24), Beatrice fears lest Dante, mistaking her words at vv. 67-69, fail to distinguish between primary creation (i.e., directly by God) and secondary creation (God acting in collaboration with other agents). As Moevs rightly insists, for Dante there is no such thing as creation independent of God; but there is (1) direct creation and (2) indirect creation; in the latter other agents besides the deity have a role. All such entities, Beatrice concludes, are “mortal,” including the four elements. This passage is not made easier by its frequent use of the past participle of the verb creare. The word creature at verse 127 has the sense of “things created” (by God). But this, mirroring the protagonist's confusion, blurs the crucial distinction that Beatrice will make; all things are created by God, some few directly (and they are eternal or, to use the correct term, sempiternal) but most parts of the made universe, as the four elements, indirectly. At verse 131 creati also refers to divine creation, but this time (and for the only time in this passage) of direct creation by God, and hence of eternal things, both angels and the heavenly spheres. In verse 135 creata refers to the secondary creation of the informative power in the stars, as it does in both of its iterations in vv. 136 and 137. The text could not be clearer, but its use of the same term, creare, for both kinds of creation, primary and secondary (i.e., direct and indirect), makes a reader's task more difficult.
This is the second consecutive canto in which Dante has not spoken (he is in fact silent from Par. V.129 until Par. VIII.44 [for his considerably longer period of abstention from speech, see Par. IX.81-Par. XIV.96]. In this canto his suppressed speech is reported (but not uttered) at vv. 10-12 and Beatrice speaks his doubt for him in vv. 55-57 and then once more here in this passage.
For a paraphrase of the first tercet, see Tozer (comm. to vv. 139-141): “From speaking of things without life Beatrice passes to those which possess the sensitive or the vegetative life without the rational soul. These also are not incorruptible, because their life is produced mediately by the influence of the stars, acting on those elements of their nature (i.e., of the matter of which they are composed) which are capable of being affected by them. 'The brightness and the motion of the holy lights (the stars) draws forth the life of brutes and plants from the combination of elements (complession) in them, which is endued with power (potenziata) thereto,' i.e., to be so affected. Complession in its technical use means 'a combination of elements,' e.g., of humours of the body, or properties of matter.” And see Moevs (The Metaphysics of Dante's “Comedy” [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], p. 125), on this passage: “The souls of all plants and animals are 'drawn from' varying compounds of the sublunar elements (complession potenzïata) by the influence of the stars, but human life (the human intelligence or rational soul) 'breathes directly' from the 'supreme beneficence,' from Intellect-Being itself. That is why the human mind or soul is always in love with, and never ceases to seek union with, the ground of its being, of all being.”
Christian Moevs (The Metaphysics of Dante's “Comedy” [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], pp. 130-132), points out an error underpinning some commentators' responses to the Dantean formulation of a central theological issue in this canto: the corruptibility of the first bodies given to humankind directly by God. Their usual position is that this body, created as home of the soul in both Adam and Eve, was incorruptible; thus its “true nature” is incorruptible, despite original sin; with resurrection we regain that incorruptible body. But what, we may ask, of the damned? Clearly their bodies are not of the incorruptible kind, since the damned all-too-painfully recollect the corruptions of the body and live repeating them eternally, as we have seen often enough in Inferno. That is a negative argument, if perhaps a useful one. Moreover, and as Moevs, following O'Keeffe (“Dante's Theory of Creation,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 26 [1924], pp. 61-62), points out, the argument is heretical on its own terms. No Christian authority ever said that the human body was eternal, even in its original Edenic condition (but exacty this opinion is found among some commentators; see, e.g., Fallani [“Il Canto VII” in “Paradiso”: Letture degli anni 1979-81, ed. S. Zennaro {Rome: Bonacci, 1989}, p. 236], holding that it is indeed immortal). And so the question arises: Will we be given what we originally had, a corruptible body washed clean of its sins (unlike the maculate body that is the property of anyone damned), as our soul has been? Or will we receive a truly incorruptible body? In one way of understanding, the body has always been, and always will be, corruptible (even if, resurrected, it will not decay any more). To triumph in it is also to triumph over it. Moevs concludes his treatment of this problematic passage as follows (p. 132): “Beatrice has re-expressed the great Clementine dictum that God became man so that man may learn from man how to become God.” But see Paul's discussion of the raising of the dead in I Corinthians 15:35-54, which certainly seems to promise incorruptible flesh to those who participate in the general resurrection.
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“Osanna, sanctus Deus sabaòth,
superillustrans claritate tua
felices ignes horum malacòth!”
Così, volgendosi a la nota sua,
fu viso a me cantare essa sustanza,
sopra la qual doppio lume s'addua;
ed essa e l'altre mossero a sua danza,
e quasi velocissime faville
mi si velar di sùbita distanza.
Io dubitava e dicea “Dille, dille!”
fra me, “dille” dicea, “a la mia donna
che mi diseta con le dolci stille.”
Ma quella reverenza che s'indonna
di tutto me, pur per Be e per ice,
mi richinava come l'uom ch'assonna.
Poco sofferse me cotal Beatrice
e cominciò, raggiandomi d'un riso
tal, che nel foco faria l'uom felice:
“Secondo mio infallibile avviso,
come giusta vendetta giustamente
punita fosse, t'ha in pensier miso;
ma io ti solverò tosto la mente;
e tu ascolta, ché le mie parole
di gran sentenza ti faran presente.
Per non soffrire a la virtù che vole
freno a suo prode, quell' uom che non nacque,
dannando sé, dannò tutta sua prole;
onde l'umana specie inferma giacque
giù per secoli molti in grande errore,
fin ch'al Verbo di Dio discender piacque
u' la natura, che dal suo fattore
s'era allungata, unì a sé in persona
con l'atto sol del suo etterno amore.
Or drizza il viso a quel ch'or si ragiona:
questa natura al suo fattore unita,
qual fu creata, fu sincera e buona;
ma per sé stessa pur fu ella sbandita
di paradiso, però che si torse
da via di verità e da sua vita.
La pena dunque che la croce porse
s'a la natura assunta si misura,
nulla già mai sì giustamente morse;
e così nulla fu di tanta ingiura,
guardando a la persona che sofferse,
in che era contratta tal natura.
Però d'un atto uscir cose diverse:
ch'a Dio e a' Giudei piacque una morte;
per lei tremò la terra e 'l ciel s'aperse.
Non ti dee oramai parer più forte,
quando si dice che giusta vendetta
poscia vengiata fu da giusta corte.
Ma io veggi' or la tua mente ristretta
di pensiero in pensier dentro ad un nodo,
del qual con gran disio solver s'aspetta.
Tu dici: 'Ben discerno ciò ch'i' odo;
ma perché Dio volesse, m'è occulto,
a nostra redenzion pur questo modo.'
Questo decreto, frate, sta sepulto
a li occhi di ciascuno il cui ingegno
ne la fiamma d'amor non è adulto.
Veramente, però ch'a questo segno
molto si mira e poco si discerne,
dirò perché tal modo fu più degno.
La divina bontà, che da sé sperne
ogne livore, ardendo in sé, sfavilla
sì che dispiega le bellezze etterne.
Ciò che da lei sanza mezzo distilla
non ha poi fine, perché non si move
la sua imprenta quand' ella sigilla.
Ciò che da essa sanza mezzo piove
libero è tutto, perché non soggiace
a la virtute de le cose nove.
Più l'è conforme, e però più le piace;
ché l'ardor santo ch'ogne cosa raggia,
ne la più somigliante è più vivace.
Di tutte queste dote s'avvantaggia
l'umana creatura, e s'una manca,
di sua nobilità convien che caggia.
Solo il peccato è quel che la disfranca
e falla dissimìle al sommo bene,
per che del lume suo poco s'imbianca;
e in sua dignità mai non rivene,
se non rïempie, dove colpa vòta,
contra mal dilettar con giuste pene.
Vostra natura, quando peccò tota
nel seme suo, da queste dignitadi,
come di paradiso, fu remota;
né ricovrar potiensi, se tu badi
ben sottilmente, per alcuna via,
sanza passar per un di questi guadi:
o che Dio solo per sua cortesia
dimesso avesse, o che l'uom per sé isso
avesse sodisfatto a sua follia.
Ficca mo l'occhio per entro l'abisso
de l'etterno consiglio, quanto puoi
al mio parlar distrettamente fisso.
Non potea l'uomo ne' termini suoi
mai sodisfar, per non potere ir giuso
con umiltate obedïendo poi,
quanto disobediendo intese ir suso;
e questa è la cagion per che l'uom fue
da poter sodisfar per sé dischiuso.
Dunque a Dio convenia con le vie sue
riparar l'omo a sua intera vita,
dico con l'una, o ver con amendue.
Ma perché l'ovra tanto è più gradita
da l'operante, quanto più appresenta
de la bontà del core ond' ell' è uscita
la divina bontà che 'l mondo imprenta,
di proceder per tutte le sue vie,
a rilevarvi suso, fu contenta.
Né tra l'ultima notte e 'l primo die
sì alto o sì magnifico processo,
o per l'una o per l'altra, fu o fie:
ché più largo fu Dio a dar sé stesso
per far l'uom sufficiente a rilevarsi,
che s'elli avesse sol da sé dimesso;
e tutti li altri modi erano scarsi
a la giustizia, se 'l Figliuol di Dio
non fosse umilïato ad incarnarsi.
Or per empierti bene ogne disio,
ritorno a dichiararti in alcun loco,
perché tu veggi lì così com' io.
Tu dici: 'Io veggio l'acqua, io veggio il foco,
l'aere e la terra e tutte lor misture
venire a corruzione, e durar poco;
e queste cose pur furon creature;
per che, se ciò ch'è detto è stato vero,
esser dovrien da corruzion sicure.'
Li angeli, frate, e 'l paese sincero
nel qual tu se', dir si posson creati,
sì come sono, in loro essere intero;
ma li alimenti che tu hai nomati
e quelle cose che di lor si fanno
da creata virtù sono informati.
Creata fu la materia ch'elli hanno;
creata fu la virtù informante
in queste stelle che 'ntorno a lor vanno.
L'anima d'ogne bruto e de le piante
di complession potenzïata tira
lo raggio e 'l moto de le luci sante;
ma vostra vita sanza mezzo spira
la somma beninanza, e la innamora
di sé sì che poi sempre la disira.
E quinci puoi argomentare ancora
vostra resurrezion, se tu ripensi
come l'umana carne fessi allora
che li primi parenti intrambo fensi.”
"Osanna sanctus Deus Sabaoth,
Superillustrans claritate tua
Felices ignes horum malahoth!"
In this wise, to his melody returning,
This substance, upon which a double light
Doubles itself, was seen by me to sing,
And to their dance this and the others moved,
And in the manner of swift-hurrying sparks
Veiled themselves from me with a sudden distance.
Doubting was I, and saying, "Tell her, tell her,"
Within me, "tell her," saying, "tell my Lady,"
Who slakes my thirst with her sweet effluences;
And yet that reverence which doth lord it over
The whole of me only by B and ICE,
Bowed me again like unto one who drowses.
Short while did Beatrice endure me thus;
And she began, lighting me with a smile
Such as would make one happy in the fire:
"According to infallible advisement,
After what manner a just vengeance justly
Could be avenged has put thee upon thinking,
But I will speedily thy mind unloose;
And do thou listen, for these words of mine
Of a great doctrine will a present make thee.
By not enduring on the power that wills
Curb for his good, that man who ne'er was born,
Damning himself damned all his progeny;
Whereby the human species down below
Lay sick for many centuries in great error,
Till to descend it pleased the Word of God
To where the nature, which from its own Maker
Estranged itself, he joined to him in person
By the sole act of his eternal love.
Now unto what is said direct thy sight;
This nature when united to its Maker,
Such as created, was sincere and good;
But by itself alone was banished forth
From Paradise, because it turned aside
Out of the way of truth and of its life.
Therefore the penalty the cross held out,
If measured by the nature thus assumed,
None ever yet with so great justice stung,
And none was ever of so great injustice,
Considering who the Person was that suffered,
Within whom such a nature was contracted.
From one act therefore issued things diverse;
To God and to the Jews one death was pleasing;
Earth trembled at it and the Heaven was opened.
It should no longer now seem difficult
To thee, when it is said that a just vengeance
By a just court was afterward avenged.
But now do I behold thy mind entangled
From thought to thought within a knot, from which
With great desire it waits to free itself.
Thou sayest, 'Well discern I what I hear;
But it is hidden from me why God willed
For our redemption only this one mode.'
Buried remaineth, brother, this decree
Unto the eyes of every one whose nature
Is in the flame of love not yet adult.
Verily, inasmuch as at this mark
One gazes long and little is discerned,
Wherefore this mode was worthiest will I say.
Goodness Divine, which from itself doth spurn
All envy, burning in itself so sparkles
That the eternal beauties it unfolds.
Whate'er from this immediately distils
Has afterwards no end, for ne'er removed
Is its impression when it sets its seal.
Whate'er from this immediately rains down
Is wholly free, because it is not subject
Unto the influences of novel things.
The more conformed thereto, the more it pleases;
For the blest ardour that irradiates all things
In that most like itself is most vivacious.
With all of these things has advantaged been
The human creature; and if one be wanting,
From his nobility he needs must fall.
'Tis sin alone which doth disfranchise him,
And render him unlike the Good Supreme,
So that he little with its light is blanched,
And to his dignity no more returns,
Unless he fill up where transgression empties
With righteous pains for criminal delights.
Your nature when it sinned so utterly
In its own seed, out of these dignities
Even as out of Paradise was driven,
Nor could itself recover, if thou notest
With nicest subtilty, by any way,
Except by passing one of these two fords:
Either that God through clemency alone
Had pardon granted, or that man himself
Had satisfaction for his folly made.
Fix now thine eye deep into the abyss
Of the eternal counsel, to my speech
As far as may be fastened steadfastly!
Man in his limitations had not power
To satisfy, not having power to sink
In his humility obeying then,
Far as he disobeying thought to rise;
And for this reason man has been from power
Of satisfying by himself excluded.
Therefore it God behoved in his own ways
Man to restore unto his perfect life,
I say in one, or else in both of them.
But since the action of the doer is
So much more grateful, as it more presents
The goodness of the heart from which it issues,
Goodness Divine, that doth imprint the world,
Has been contented to proceed by each
And all its ways to lift you up again;
Nor 'twixt the first day and the final night
Such high and such magnificent proceeding
By one or by the other was or shall be;
For God more bounteous was himself to give
To make man able to uplift himself,
Than if he only of himself had pardoned;
And all the other modes were insufficient
For justice, were it not the Son of God
Himself had humbled to become incarnate.
Now, to fill fully each desire of thine,
Return I to elucidate one place,
In order that thou there mayst see as I do.
Thou sayst: 'I see the air, I see the fire,
The water, and the earth, and all their mixtures
Come to corruption, and short while endure;
And these things notwithstanding were created;'
Therefore if that which I have said were true,
They should have been secure against corruption.
The Angels, brother, and the land sincere
In which thou art, created may be called
Just as they are in their entire existence;
But all the elements which thou hast named,
And all those things which out of them are made,
By a created virtue are informed.
Created was the matter which they have;
Created was the informing influence
Within these stars that round about them go.
The soul of every brute and of the plants
By its potential temperament attracts
The ray and motion of the holy lights;
But your own life immediately inspires
Supreme Beneficence, and enamours it
So with herself, it evermore desires her.
And thou from this mayst argue furthermore
Your resurrection, if thou think again
How human flesh was fashioned at that time
When the first parents both of them were made."
If one were to select a single passage from the entire Commedia that seems most self-consciously wrought and thoroughly marked by poetic exuberance, it might be difficult to find one more fitting that description than this, with its opening mixture of Hebrew and Latin, the mysterious “double light” glowing upon Justinian, the sudden departure of that soul and his dancing fellows, the protagonist's wild excitement in his bafflement over a theological question, and, finally, the linguistic playfulness of the poet's reference to Beatrice's name. It is as though Dante were apologizing in advance for the lack of poetic energy that typifies the rest of the canto, turned over to the theological needs of its protagonist as ministered to by his guide.
Canto VII almost seems to be offered as reassurance to readers with a religious and/or theological bent that we've closed the books on Roman history and Italian politics and now will stick to our good Christian knitting - for a while, at least. However, for the imperial resonances in the opening three terzine, see Giovanni Fallani (“Il Canto VII” in “Paradiso”: Letture degli anni 1979-81, ed. S. Zennaro [Rome: Bonacci, 1989], pp. 224-27).
See Tozer's translation and note (comm. to vv. 1-3): “'Hosanna, holy God of hosts, who by Thy brightness dost illuminate from above the happy fires of these realms.' These verses appear to have been Dante's own, not a hymn of the Church; but they are in Latin, to correspond to other mediaeval hymns. malacoth: as Dante required a rhyme for Sabaoth – no easy thing to find – he availed himself of the word malachoth, which he met with in St. Jerome's Preface to the Vulgate, where it is translated by regnorum (realms). The proper form of this, which is read in modern editions of the Vulgate, is mamlachot, but in Dante's time malachoth was the accepted reading.”
For glossolalia (“speaking in tongues”) as a concern to Dante, see Hollander (Dante and Paul's “five words with understanding,” Occasional Papers, No. 1, Center for Medieval and Early Renaissance Texts and Studies [Binghamton, NY: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1992)]. And see Giuseppe Di Scipio (The Presence of Pauline Thought in the Works of Dante [Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1995], p. 281) for another assertion that Inferno VII.1 is a parodic version of glossolalia. Sarolli, who almost gets credit for being the first writer to connect, in an oppositional relation, the first lines of this canto with those of the seventh canto of Inferno, “Pape Satàn, pape Satàn, aleppe!” (Prolegomena alla “Divina Commedia” [Florence: Olschki, 1971], pp. 289-90), also unaccountably urges a reader to understand that the macaronic passage includes, not only Hebrew and Latin, but Greek. (Tommaseo, in passing, does mention Inf. VII.1 in conjunction with the opening of Par. VII, thus depriving Sarolli of an honor he merits, since Tommaseo makes no effort to deal with the significance of the phenomenon he has observed.)
See the note to.Paradiso V.1. This is the third consecutive canto that begins with a speaker's voice (rather than narration) and the second consecutive canto to begin with the same speaker's voice, both of these phenomena unique occurrences.
Justinian's first word of his last speech, Osanna, has a history in the poem: see Purgatorio XI.11 and XXIX.51. After this appearance, it also appears in Paradiso VIII.29; XXVIII.118; XXXII.135. Its six appearances make it the most present “foreign” word in the poem. The Ottimo hears its resonance from the shouts for the entry of Jesus into Jerusalem (e.g., John. 12:13); Benvenuto, discussing (comm. to Par. VIII.22-30) the word's appearance in Paradiso VIII.29 has this to say: “Ista vox hebraica significat immensam affectionem mentis quae non potest bene exprimi graece vel latine” (This Hebrew word signifies immense mental affection which cannot be properly expressed either in Greek or in Latin). The second Hebrew word in this line, sabaòth, is genitive plural “of the armies” (or “hosts,” as Tozer translates, an English version of Latin hostis [enemy], but without its sense of opposition).
For the program of song in the last cantica, see the note to Paradiso XXI.58-60.
God is depicted as shining down from above and illumining these saved souls who, along with Justinian, have appeared to Dante in Mercury in the moments before they withdraw from Dante's presence.
Justinian is now presented as a “substance,” an irreducible human soul, singing this holy song. We perhaps now understand why Dante has gone to such lengths to associate the emperor, inspired keeper of the Roman laws, and himself, inspired poet of empire, in the preceding canto (see Par. VI.11; VI.23; VI.88); their tasks are not dissimilar.
The neologism s'addua is problematic. Readers are divided as to what exactly the double light represents, and there are widely various opinions. Mazzoni (“Il canto VI del Paradiso,” Letture classensi 9-10 [1982]: 142), suggests that these lights are, the one, earthly, the other, heavenly, that is, the emperor's past and present identities. Bosco/Reggio (comm. to this verse) are of the opinion that the lights are of the warrior and of the legislator. However, as we have seen in the preceding canto, Justinian seems most eager to put the military life behind him (Par. VI.25-27); thus it would be strange for Dante to treat him in such wise. And see Rachel Jacoff (“Sacrifice and Empire: Thematic Analogies in San Vitale and the Paradiso,” in Renaissance Studies in Honor of Craig Hugh Smyth, ed. Andrew Morrogh et al. [Florence: Giunti Barbèra, 1985], pp. 323-24), arguing for Virgil's phrase “geminas... flammas,” the description of Augustus at the helm during the battle of Actium, his brows casting a double flame, as he is portrayed on the shield of Aeneas (Aen. VIII.680, part of the same passage visited in the last canto: see the note to Par. VI.79-81). That seems a promising lead to follow. However, it would probably be strange for Dante to have “borrowed” Augustus's identity for Justinian. There is also a possibility that Dante is thinking of the passage in Acts 2:3-4 in which the apostles are given the gift of glossolalia. There appeared to them cloven tongues of fire; these settled on each of them; they were then filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak such languages as the Spirit gave them to utter. That is possibly reflected in what has been occurring in the opening lines of Canto VII; however, there may be a problem with the “dispertitae linguae tanquam ignis,” which may not be all that well described by the phrase “doppio lume.”
Bosco/Reggio point out that “s'addua” (inflected form of the verb coined by Dante, adduarsi) will soon be joined by such other numerical coinages as incinquarsi (Par. IX.40) and intrearsi (Par. XIII.57).
Whereas the souls in the Moon may have been portrayed as vanishing downward into the matter of that body (Par. III.122-123), these pretty clearly travel a great distance upward very rapidly. Dante has now got his logistics under control: the souls that appear in the planets return to the Empyrean once they have completed their mission, which is to instruct Dante.
This is the third and final time Dante uses repetitions of the word dì (see Purg. XXXI.5 and Par. V.122 for identical paired presences of the imperative form of dire) to give a greater sense of intensity to a speaker's urging. The first two times Beatrice is speaking to the protagonist; now Dante speaks to himself, in phrasing that is still more insistent.
The tercet, a dizzying display of alliteration (there are nine d sounds in three lines), also contains a possible pun. Beatrice's “sweet drops” in Italian (dolci stille) sound reasonably like Bonagiunta's new sweet style (dolce stil[e] novo [Purg. XXIV.57]), which he attributes to Dante's poetry in praise of Beatrice. The likelihood of intention behind such a play on words is increased by the presence of the same three rhymes later on in this canto, vv. 53-57 (nodo, ch'i' odo, and modo) as are found in Purgatorio XXIV.53-57. These are the only two occurrences of these constituents of terza rima in the poem; that they occur at the same numerical placemarks (vv. 53, 55, 57) is hardly conclusive evidence, but doesn't hurt the case, either.
For Dante's phrase “dolci stille” (sweet drops), see Massimiliano Chiamenti (Dante Alighieri traduttore [Florence: Le Lettere, 1995], p. 178); see also Selene Sarteschi (“Sant'Agostino in Dante e nell'età di Dante,” in her Per la “Commedia” e non per essa soltanto [Rome: Bulzoni, 2002 {1999}], p. 186), indicating a possible source in Augustine, Confessiones XIII.xxx.45: “Et audivi, domine deus meus, et elinxi stillam dulcedinis ex tua veritate” (And I heard, O Lord my God, and drank up a drop of sweetness out of Thy truth [tr. E.B. Pusey] {italics added}).
In an exerted tercet, the poet says that he bowed his head, under the sway of his devotion to Beatrice, just as does a man who nods off to sleep. For the same phrase, “t'assonna,” see Paradiso XXXII.139. There it precedes the vision of the Godhead, featuring the miracle of the Incarnation. It is perhaps not accidental that this is a central subject in Beatrice's long disquisition that begins at verse 19 and runs the rest of the canto.
Surely what is meant is “any part of her name,” but we may want to reflect that the parts referred to just happen to be the first and the last, mirroring, perhaps, the alpha and omega that represent God. “Bice” was, of course, Beatrice's nickname (see Vita nuova XXIV.8, the ninth line of the sonnet “Io mi senti' svegliar dentro a lo core”: “monna Vanna e monna Bice,” where Dante observes Guido Cavalcanti's lady, Giovanna, preceding his lady, Beatrice.)
Some commentators try to associate the foco with the fires of Hell, but it seems more likely that Dante is saying that Beatrice's smile had the power to calm even one who had been set on fire. And see Purgatorio XXVII.10-54 for Dante's hesitant encounter with the purging flames of the terrace of Lust.
Had not Justinian just spoken at even greater length, this would have been the longest single speech in the poem, extending 130 lines from verse 19 to the end of the canto (148). The passage beginning here is described by Carroll (comm. to vv. 10-66) as “the chief theological discourse in the Paradiso.” All the rest of the canto is, in fact, a Beatricean commentary on two passages in the preceding canto, first (vv. 19-51) Justinian's presentation of Titus's doing “vengeance for vengeance” in his destruction of Jerusalem (Par. VI.91-93), second (vv. 52-120) his previous claim that Tiberius, by having sovereignty when Christ was put to death (Par. VI.89-90), took “vengeance” for God's wrath by presiding over the Crucifixion. It is interesting that Dante makes his two unusual choices for a short list of the most significant Roman emperors the focus of Beatrice's commentary in verse.
This stylistic tour de force (having Beatrice, presented playfully in the fifth canto as the author of the poem [vv. 16-17], now reappear as the commentator on two passages from the sixth canto) is not calculated to set enthusiasts of lyric poetry aflutter. Terza rima is about the only thing poetic that we find in the rest of the canto, as Beatrice's language is Scholastic-sounding and severe, her interests only instructional, and correctively so.
The only other appearance of the word infallibile occurs in Inferno XXIX.56, where it modifies giustizia. Here Beatrice gives her infallible (because she speaks with the authority of her Maker) idea of the justness of God's vengeance, the “negative form” of his justice, punishment.
For a consideration of the way in which Christ's prediction of the fall of Jerusalem (Luke 19:36-46) and the city's conquest by the Romans in A.D. 70 are reflected in this and other passages (and also look forward to the coming punishment of Florence), see Ronald Martinez (“Dante's Jeremiads: The Fall of Jerusalem and the Burden of the New Pharisees, the Capetians, and Florence,” in Dante for the New Millennium, ed. Teodolinda Barolini and H. Wayne Storey [New York: Fordham University Press, 2003], pp. 301-19).
The presence of two words directly related to “justice” in this verse begins by far the largest single deployment in any canto of such words: giusta and giustamente here; giustamente (42); giusta (50 and 51); giuste (84); giustizia (119). The neighboring canto (VI) is tied for second place with four, thus making these two cantos the center of this concern in a poem that is perhaps more concerned with justice than with any other single concept. See the note to Inferno III.4. And now see Patrick Boyde (Human Vices and Human Worth in Dante's “Comedy” [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000], Chapter Nine).
Adam's sin of transgression (and it is significant that Dante here is placing on his shoulders the sin of Eve) was what “brought sin into the world and all our woe” (Milton, Paradise Lost I.3), to borrow the words of another major poet's reference to that transgression. It is this for which the Word of God chose, in his love for humankind, to offer Himself as flesh in sacrificial atonement for all sin since Adam. (It was precisely this humanity of Jesus in which Justinian did not at first believe [see Par. VI.13-15].)
Adam was not born; he was created directly by God, as was (almost) Eve.
Scartazzini/Vandelli (comm. on vv. 28-33) point to Monarchia III.iv.14 for the phrase infirmitas peccati (infirmity of sin) as corresponding to the sickness afflicting the human race after Adam's fall.
Later Dante will spell out the exact amount of time that passed between Adam's sin and his redemption, 5232 years. See Paradiso XXVI.118-123.
The “Word of God” is Jesus, as Second Person of the Trinity.
This tercet includes reference to the two other aspects of the triune God, the Sapience represented by the Son having been mentioned in verse 30 (where Beatrice refers to the Word becoming flesh): the Power represented by the Father, “Maker” of all things; the Love represented by the Holy Spirit.
Humankind, a combination of immortal soul and mortal body, as present in Adam and Eve, quickly (for exactly how quickly, see Par. XXVI.139-142) turned from God to sin and was sent out of Eden. If we measure what was done to Christ upon the cross by the enormous burden of sin He took on, His penalty was utterly just; if, on the other hand, we measure the worth of the one who was punished, no greater outrage was ever committed, especially when we consider what He had voluntarily consented to.
The verse repeats, as Benvenuto da Imola (comm. to vv. 34-39) was perhaps the first to realize, Christ's dictum (John 14:6) “Ego sum via, et veritas, et vita” (I am the way, and the truth, and the life). The text continues, “No one comes to the Father unless through me.”
The paired results of Christ's sacrifice are expressed in a chiasmus: The death of Jesus pleased (a) God and (b) the Jews; it caused both (b) the earthquake at the Crucifixion and (a) the opening of Heaven to humankind. The Jews took perverse pleasure at the killing of Jesus for which reason God made the earth shake, expressing His displeasure; at the same time, and of far greater importance, God accepted Jesus' sacrifice and opened Heaven to redeemed humanity.
Beatrice's repetition of the adjective giusta (just) underlines her main concern for Dante, that he understand that God never acts unjustly. She has taken care of his first doubt, which arose from what Justinian said about the reign of Titus.
Next Beatrice turns to the problem that arose for the protagonist in Justinian's remarks about the reign of Tiberius. This is one of the most pernicious stumbling blocks for non-believers and even some Christians. It is the question posed (and answered) by Beatrice here (see Scartazzini's lengthy gloss to this passage, which deals with Dante's complex discussion clearly). The two main sources for Dante's thinking about the justification for the death of Jesus on the cross are, according to Scartazzini, St. Thomas (ST III, q. 46, a. 1-3) and St. Anselm of Canterbury (Cur Deus homo). For insistence on the primacy, for Dante's thinking on this subject, of Anselm's tract, see Fallani (“Il Canto VII” in “Paradiso”: Letture degli anni 1979-81, ed. S. Zennaro [Rome: Bonacci, 1989], pp. 233-34).
Now, reading Dante's mind, Beatrice sees what is troubling him; there must have been some other way for human sin to have been canceled short of having the incarnate Godhead be slain upon a cross. Beatrice warns that her proof will be difficult, because only those nourished over time by the warmth of God's affection ever understand this mystery, i.e, only those inspired by the Holy Spirit are able to understand the love for humankind that impelled Jesus to give up his life for us.
From Lombardi (1791, comm. to vv. 56-57) to Grabher (1934, comm. to vv. 55-63) most commentators think the word pur here means “only.” Starting with Trucchi (1936, comm. to vv. 52-57), the tide begins swinging to proprio (precisely, exactly); Chimenz (1962, comm. to vv. 56-57) prefers this meaning to “only,” as do Bosco/Reggio (1979, comm. to vv. 56-57); as our translation indicates, we do, too.
Tozer's summary of these passages may be helpful: “Man, inasmuch as his soul proceeded direct from God, possessed the gifts of immortality, free will, and likeness to God, and on these depended his high position (vv. 64-78). By the Fall the freedom of his will and his likeness to God were impaired, and his position was lost (vv. 79-81). There were only two ways by which he could recover this, i.e., either (1) that he should make satisfaction himself for his sin, or (2) that God in His mercy should pardon him freely (vv. 82-93). The former of these it was impossible for man to do, because he could not render any adequate recompense; it remained therefore for God to guarantee his pardon (vv. 94-105). This God did in a manner at once most consonant with His own nature, as being perfect Goodness, and most advantageous to man, and most in accordance with the demands of justice. He followed both the way of mercy and the way of justice. By the Incarnation and death of Christ He enabled man to regain his lost position, and at the same time made the satisfaction for his sins which justice required” (vv. 106-20).
For an attempt to demonstrate the closeness of the thought here to that found in Plato's Timaeus, see Fraccaroli (“Dante e il Timeo,” in Il Timeo, tr. Giuseppe Fraccaroli [Turin: Fratelli Bocca, 1906], pp. 393-97), disputing the more usual nineteenth-century claim of a dependence upon Boethius. However, see Richard Green's note to the passage, in his translation of the Consolatio (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, ed. O. Piest [New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962], p. 60), pointing out that the poem (“O qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernas” [O you who govern the world with eternal reason]) in Boethius (Consolatio III.m9) is recognized as being an epitome of the first section of the Timaeus. Among the early commentators, Pietro di Dante (comm to vv. 64-78) cites Boethius (“Rather it was the form of the highest good, existing within You without envy, which caused You to fashion all things according to the external exemplar”), while Benvenuto da Imola (comm. to vv. 64-66) and Francesco da Buti (comm. to vv. 64-75) cite Timaeus 29e (the opening of Book I): “Optimus erat, et ab optimo omnis invidia relegata est” (He [the god who made universal disorder into order] was good: and in the good no jealousy in any matter can ever arise [tr. F.M. Cornford - Plato is speaking of the divine mind, as is Boethius). For more support of Plato's candidacy and general consideration of the problem, see Cesare Galimberti (“Canto VII,” in Lectura Dantis Scaligera: “Paradiso”, dir. M. Marcazzan [Florence: Le Monnier, 1968], pp. 227-35). Sapegno (comm. to vv. 64-66) was perhaps the first to cite both (Boethius, Cons. III.m9.1-6; Plato, Tim. I). Giacalone (comm. to vv. 64-66) offers helpful discussion and bibliography.
Those things created directly, i.e., without mediation, by God include the angels, the heavenly spheres, unformed matter (e.g., the earth's surface, awaiting the formal intervention of God to be given its definitive shape), and the rational part of the tripartite human soul. For the distinction between this unformed God-created matter, Augustine's materia informis, and “prime matter” (materia prima), see David O'Keeffe (“Dante's Theory of Creation,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 26 [1924], pp. 51-57).
That which God creates unmediated is eternal and unvarying.
The “more recent” things were created, not directly by God, but with some mediation (e.g., planetary influence), since all of these were part of a “secondary creation.”
In Adam, we all sinned, and have been denied the privileges that once were his, particularly three things: immortality, the earthly paradise, and our resemblance to God.
We were not capable of abasing ourselves in humility deep enough to make up for the amount we had risen up in pride.
Thus it remained for God to ransom us using either mercy or justice. He elected to employ both of these.
Dante employs hysteron proteron yet again to mark either end of human history, the last night of life on earth (see the Apocalypse) and the first day (see Genesis). In the period of time sectored in that arc no greater act ever was or shall be than Jesus' act of self-humiliation to save humankind.
This passage and the rest of the canto deal with the ontology of God's creation, specifically the distinctions between the nature of being in that which is created directly by God (things eternal or, more properly, since they have a beginning in time, sempiternal) and in that which, though created by God (for nothing that exists owes or can owe its existence to any other first cause), has other participation in its making (i.e., they are made by the intervention of other already existent things, as are almost all things that we encounter: butterflies, the cliffs of Dover, rain). On this question see Moore's late essay, “Dante's Theory of Creation” (Studies in Dante, Fourth Series: Textual Criticism of the “Convivio” and Miscellaneous Essays [Oxford: Clarendon, 1968 {1917}], pp. 134-65), and the stern response by David O'Keeffe (“Dante's Theory of Creation,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 26 [1924]; Moevs' discussion (The Metaphysics of Dante's “Comedy” [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], pp. 122-26), agrees with O'Keeffe's objections to Moore's formulations, which underlie many later (mis-)understandings of the basic cosmic views put forward here by Beatrice, and which, as a result, are incorrect. As Moevs points out (pp. 123-24), Beatrice fears lest Dante, mistaking her words at vv. 67-69, fail to distinguish between primary creation (i.e., directly by God) and secondary creation (God acting in collaboration with other agents). As Moevs rightly insists, for Dante there is no such thing as creation independent of God; but there is (1) direct creation and (2) indirect creation; in the latter other agents besides the deity have a role. All such entities, Beatrice concludes, are “mortal,” including the four elements. This passage is not made easier by its frequent use of the past participle of the verb creare. The word creature at verse 127 has the sense of “things created” (by God). But this, mirroring the protagonist's confusion, blurs the crucial distinction that Beatrice will make; all things are created by God, some few directly (and they are eternal or, to use the correct term, sempiternal) but most parts of the made universe, as the four elements, indirectly. At verse 131 creati also refers to divine creation, but this time (and for the only time in this passage) of direct creation by God, and hence of eternal things, both angels and the heavenly spheres. In verse 135 creata refers to the secondary creation of the informative power in the stars, as it does in both of its iterations in vv. 136 and 137. The text could not be clearer, but its use of the same term, creare, for both kinds of creation, primary and secondary (i.e., direct and indirect), makes a reader's task more difficult.
This is the second consecutive canto in which Dante has not spoken (he is in fact silent from Par. V.129 until Par. VIII.44 [for his considerably longer period of abstention from speech, see Par. IX.81-Par. XIV.96]. In this canto his suppressed speech is reported (but not uttered) at vv. 10-12 and Beatrice speaks his doubt for him in vv. 55-57 and then once more here in this passage.
For a paraphrase of the first tercet, see Tozer (comm. to vv. 139-141): “From speaking of things without life Beatrice passes to those which possess the sensitive or the vegetative life without the rational soul. These also are not incorruptible, because their life is produced mediately by the influence of the stars, acting on those elements of their nature (i.e., of the matter of which they are composed) which are capable of being affected by them. 'The brightness and the motion of the holy lights (the stars) draws forth the life of brutes and plants from the combination of elements (complession) in them, which is endued with power (potenziata) thereto,' i.e., to be so affected. Complession in its technical use means 'a combination of elements,' e.g., of humours of the body, or properties of matter.” And see Moevs (The Metaphysics of Dante's “Comedy” [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], p. 125), on this passage: “The souls of all plants and animals are 'drawn from' varying compounds of the sublunar elements (complession potenzïata) by the influence of the stars, but human life (the human intelligence or rational soul) 'breathes directly' from the 'supreme beneficence,' from Intellect-Being itself. That is why the human mind or soul is always in love with, and never ceases to seek union with, the ground of its being, of all being.”
Christian Moevs (The Metaphysics of Dante's “Comedy” [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005], pp. 130-132), points out an error underpinning some commentators' responses to the Dantean formulation of a central theological issue in this canto: the corruptibility of the first bodies given to humankind directly by God. Their usual position is that this body, created as home of the soul in both Adam and Eve, was incorruptible; thus its “true nature” is incorruptible, despite original sin; with resurrection we regain that incorruptible body. But what, we may ask, of the damned? Clearly their bodies are not of the incorruptible kind, since the damned all-too-painfully recollect the corruptions of the body and live repeating them eternally, as we have seen often enough in Inferno. That is a negative argument, if perhaps a useful one. Moreover, and as Moevs, following O'Keeffe (“Dante's Theory of Creation,” Revue néoscolastique de philosophie 26 [1924], pp. 61-62), points out, the argument is heretical on its own terms. No Christian authority ever said that the human body was eternal, even in its original Edenic condition (but exacty this opinion is found among some commentators; see, e.g., Fallani [“Il Canto VII” in “Paradiso”: Letture degli anni 1979-81, ed. S. Zennaro {Rome: Bonacci, 1989}, p. 236], holding that it is indeed immortal). And so the question arises: Will we be given what we originally had, a corruptible body washed clean of its sins (unlike the maculate body that is the property of anyone damned), as our soul has been? Or will we receive a truly incorruptible body? In one way of understanding, the body has always been, and always will be, corruptible (even if, resurrected, it will not decay any more). To triumph in it is also to triumph over it. Moevs concludes his treatment of this problematic passage as follows (p. 132): “Beatrice has re-expressed the great Clementine dictum that God became man so that man may learn from man how to become God.” But see Paul's discussion of the raising of the dead in I Corinthians 15:35-54, which certainly seems to promise incorruptible flesh to those who participate in the general resurrection.
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